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ABSTRACT
As the real estate development industry becomes
increasingly complex, many developer-CEOs are hiring
management consultants to advise on a wide range of
strategic issues, e.g., "How to identify the 'right'
market?", or "How to preserve the informality and
efficiency of a small company during periods of rapid
growth?" This thesis examines relationships between
developers and their management consultants, focusing on
process consultants, i.e., those who act primarily as
facilitators for their clients' decision-making.
The research includes a ten-year survey of changes in the
real estate development industry, the evolution in the
management consulting industry, and approaches to
strategic planning. Three key questions guide the
study:
1. According to academic research, what are the
qualities, skills, and processes necessary for
effective management consulting?
2. How do real estate executives and management
consultants establish and manage their working
relationships?
3. What are the key features of successful engagements
between real estate executives and management
consultants?
The research includes a literature review, interviews with
industry leaders, and investigations at three Boston-area
development firms where management consultants were hired
*to help with strategic planning. Data from the sites are
presented as three mini-case studies.
The findings indicate a higher "value-added" accrues to
the real estate developer who successfully matches the
firm's needs with a consultant's skill. The thesis
discusses appropriate methodologies for achieving the
"best" match. It concludes with guidelines for real
estate developers seeking to maximize the returns on their
investment in management consultants.
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The art of progress is to preserve order
amid change and to preserve change amid
order. (Alfred Lord Whitehead)
Although it is common to debate many aspects of the
real estate development business (e.g., cap rates and
regional economics) there is one statement on which
consensus is easily reached. Most would agree that a
decade of change has confounded the industry. The
business is more complex as a result of both external and
internal pressures, and this complexity tests the mettle
of even the most savvy, deal-making executive. The
challenge is to maintain stability in a rapidly-changing
world and to simultaneously foster the entrepreneurism
which is the heart of the industry. More and more, real
estate developers are turning to management consultants
for help. This thesis concerns the relationship between
real estate developers and their management consultants.
The focus is on process consultants, i.e., those who act
primarily as facilitators for their clients' strategic
decision-making process. The major questions are:
1. According to academic research, what are the
qualities, skills, and processes necessary
for effective management consulting?
2. How do real estate executives and
consultants establish and manage their
working relationsips?
Page 6
3. What are the key features of successful
engagements between real estate executives
and management consultants?
Chapter 1, A Decade of Change, summarizes the trends
in the real estate and management consulting industries
during the last decade. Included, also, is a discussion
of strategic planning methodologies and attitudes. The
chapter concludes with a summary of consulting processes
and typologies. Chapter 2, Field Investigations, presents
a brief description of selection criteria and research
methodology, and data from the three sites chosen for
research. Chapter 3, Analysis of Field Data, evaluates
the extent to which activities at the three sites are
consistent with models from the academic literatures. In
Chapter 4, Final Comments, the author shares her
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 1
A DECADE OF CHANGE
This chapter provides a context for this research.
It contains a summary of the trends over the last ten
years in (1) the real estate development business; (2) the
use of strategic planning as a management tool; and (3)
the management consulting field. It concludes with a
description of consulting typologies and processes.
The research for this section consists of:
(a) a review of recent literature in both
academic and trade journals, text books and
periodicals; and
(b) interviews with practicioners in the field.
THE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT BUSINESS
Real estate formerly had very close
parallels to the parlor game of Monopoly.
When a developer wanted to play, he could go
to the bank and get some money, not so much
for doing anything special, but merely
because he wanted to play the game.
(Roulac,.1976)
Roulac's analogy to board game maneuvers is not too
preposterous. Risk was always part of the game, an
exciting and challenging aspect which attracted the
confident and zealous. However, in the last ten to
fifteen years, the uncertainties and complexities have
multiplied. Consequently, the "players" have had to think
more strategically to keep ahead of their competitors.
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Today, the game is more akin to chess than monopoly.
Prior to the 1970's, most developers were able to
operate in a fairly simple environment. The steps between
securing a site and occupying the building were more or
less routine. If the proposed development exceeded the
allowable building limits, the developer could generally
obtain a rezoning of the site without significant delay to
the project. The rules of the game were clear to all
players.
Typically, real estate development businesses were
fairly small and lean, often sole proprietorships. Firms
had little or no interest is organizational structure or
decision-making processes. Even the biggest development
companies and the real estate departments of larger
institutions had small management teams when compared with
industrial companies. (Byrne and Cadman, 1974)
Since the 1970's, however, there have been major
changes in how the game is played. First, a "revolution
of change" swept across the real estate financial field
(Downs, 1985) Second, the increase of government influence
complicated and lengthened the permitting process. Other
externalities which affected the real estate business
include advances in construction methods and materials,
the development of more sophisticated computer software
applications, and changing demographics. And, thirdly,
the combination of external factors forced many internal
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organizational changes.
Two of the most significant external factors
affecting organizational development have been change in
the financial marketplace and the level of government
influence.
Changes in the Financial Marketplace
The reasons for the change in the financial
marketplace are complex, but generally, they can be
examined within three major categories: 1) shifts in
expectations about future inflation among lenders and
equity investors; 2) partial deregulation of the financial
markets; and 3) changes in fiscal and monetary policies
worldwide. (For a detailed analysis, see Downs, 1985.)
Change in the financial marketplace had two
widesweeping effects across the real estate industry: more
volatile interest rates and the integration of capital
markets (Downs, 1985). How have those effects altered the
way the industry operates?
More volatile interest rates affect the cost of
capital, i.e., there is more risk to borrowing money.
Overall project costs fluctuate with each fractional
change in interest rates, and buyers' ability to secure
financing is harder to predict.
After the economic gyrations of the 1970's, lenders
and investors became more savvy at shifting inflation risk
to the borrower, e.g., through adjustable rate mortgages.
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Uncertainty about inflation is likely to continue because
of greater international economic interdependence and
improvements in communications and technology for funds
transfers among markets (Downs, 1985). Capital markets
will react quickly to changes, or threats of changes, in
the economic environment. Therefore, decision-makers in
the real estate --lenders, borrowers and investors-- who
are inextricably linked to the capital markets, must craft
strategies (i.e., make incremental adjustments) to
function in a volatile marketplace.
The second major effect of change in the financial
marketplace, integration of capital markets in the last
decade, further complicated the real estate business. For
example, partial deregulation of thrifts (e.g., savings
banks) removed many of the legal barriers which had
divided the capital markets - into housing and
non-residential segments (Downs, 1985). The melding of
the two large segments resulted in greater competition,
more innovation, and more specialization within the
capital markets.
The changes in real estate capital markets will
affect development firms' deal-making. For example, the
growth of pension fund investment in real estate, from $20
billion in 1983 to $36.5 billion in 1986 (Real Estate
Research Corporation, 1987), signals a shift toward higher
equity participation by developers, more guarantees for
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investors, and slower projects. The entrepreneurial
informality of the independent developer is not
particularly well-suited to the analytic tradition of
institutions where fund managers need to explain and
justify their actions to a heirachy of authority. In some
cases, the more formalized structure of the capital source
(the institutional investor) has forced developers to
adapt to more stringent approval criteria. Beyond the
proforma financials, the person trying to attract
investors and impress lenders will need to sell the
project on the basis of market analyses, pre-construction
sales, regulatory compliance and excellent design. The
management challenges cross many disciplines.
Downs (1987) believes that the essence of a good
developer is the combination of innovative genius and
tireless persistence. He opines that those traits are far
less likely to exist in a large corporation than in an
independent entrepreneurial firm. On the other hand, the
Real Estate Research Corporation predicts that the rest of
the decade will be dominated by "the pros and big
players". Whether corporate or independent, the
successful development firm requires savvy management.
Donald Riehl, a trustee of the Urban Land Institute and
Chairman of its Research Committee, recently cautioned
that "the current market allows no tolerance for poor
management". One of his colleagues, Jon Reynolds, added
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think globally and
Successful developers.... .will devise management
strategies that allow them to profit in tough situations".
(ULI, 1987)
Increased Government Influence
Government has increased both its direct and indirect
influence in the real estate business over the last
decade. Examples of direct influence are:
o More widespread imposition of environmental
laws, such as the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986.
In New York, the Shore Realty Corporation was
held reponsible for cleaning up hazardous wastes on
land recently purchased, even though it had neither
owned the property when wastes were disposed, nor
caused the release of wastes. Shore knew of the
contamination before purchase. The developer paid
$435,000 in 1983 for 3.2 acres, spent over $100,000
for the cleanup (estimated to cost over $4
million), and tentatively agreed to relinquish the
property to the state afterwards. (Salvesen, 1988)
o Direct investment of public dollars in
development.
In San Diego, California, the city established
the San Diego Centre City Development Corporation
and pledged $33 million for redevelopment of 11.5
acres in a blighted area. The development was ajoint effort with private developer Ernest W. Hahn,
Inc. (Frieden and Sagalyn,1985)
o Passage of strict land use controls.
In January 1988, the Boston Redevelopment
Authority passed a temporary zoning measure
requiring developers with plans to construct
offices in industrially-zoned parts of the city to
get prior approvals from the BRA and the Board of
Appeals. Previously, they had been able to
construct by right. (Boston-Globe, 1988)
Examples of indirect influence are:
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"developers should act locally.
o The Tax Reform Act of 1986
The act includes a provision for tax credits
for developers of low-income housing. It redefines
the rules for using passive losses from real estate
limited partnerships for tax shelters, making
investment in LP's much less attractive. (Boston
GLobe,1988)
o The increasing willingness to appoint or endorse
Citizens' Advisory Committees to participate in the
review of large real estate projects.
The area residents, organized as "Citizens for
a Better New England Life", were unhappy with the
design for twin tower office buildings in Back Bay.
The Boston Redevelopment Authority forced the
developers to hire a new architect to redesign the
second tower. This action occurred after approvals
for the original design had been given. The
redesign went through a series of citizen review
meetings over the course of a year. The new
building is 100,000 sq. ft. smaller in size.
(Boston Globe, 1988)
These examples demonstrate that the real estate
development business operates increasingly within the
public domain; consequently, developers must learn new
skills and devise new strategies to move projects through
the permitting process.
In summary, the changes in the financial marketplace
and the increased involvement of government have had
profound effects on the real estate development business.
The overall result is that uncertainty and risk are on the
rise throughout the industry.
Organizational Changes
As the variables in the external environment
multiplied during the last decade, development firms
experienced growth, shifts in product lines and changes in
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mission. For example, the Flatley Company's product line
expanded to include hotels and nursing homes, and its
construction budget mushroomed from $15 million in 1980 to
$100 million in 1987 and then shrunk to $50 million in
1988 (Jereski,1988). Authentic Homes, a family business
since the 1940's, has operated since 1985 as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a British multinational
construction firm (Weremiuk, 1988). Copley Real Estate
Advisors, spun off from The New England in 1982, grew in
five years to more than a sixfold increase in the original
staff of 14 (Campbell, Olivier, Selvaradjah and Warren,
1987).
The external environment may be the catalyst for
organizational change, but only the people inside the
organization can effect the change. Therefore, top-level
managers in the real estate development business must
grapple with human resource and organizational structure
issues which go far beyond "cutting a new deal" and their
focused, project-specific decision-making. Their agendas
have been broadened to include "corporate culture",
"vision", "career paths", and "job satisfaction".
How has the industry responded to the external
pressures and the need for organizational development?
Graduate-level degrees, industry training programs, and
the use of consultants are three responses. For example,
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology established the
Center for Real Estate Development (CRED) in 1984 and
initiated the first Master of Science in Real Estate
Development program. In addition, CRED annually offers a
professional development program consisting of
mini-courses designed for managers in real estate
development.
Several recent events are examples of the industry's
efforts to improve managerial skills among real estate
executives. Organizations such as the Urban Land
Institute (ULI) offer professional development seminars.
Since 1986, ULI has thrice offered a seminar, "Managing a
Development Company". Attendance at the Spring 1988
program was 125, up about 20% from the last program in
December 1987. Attendees came from various-sized
development companies across the country. (ULI, 1988)
Real estate trade journals are increasing their emphasis
on management issues, as evidenced by National Real Estate
Investor's introduction last year of a new column on
strategic planning for development firms. Also,
developers affiliated with academic institutions are
getting more exposure to management issues (e.g., panel
discussion, "Managing for Change", featured at the 1988
spring members' meeting at CRED.)
Consultants are not new to real estate development.
By and large, self-proclaimed real estate consultants are
linked with the American Society of Real Estate Counselors
Page 16
Page 17
(ASREC) which has a thirty-year history of providing
expertise to the development industry. ASREC emphasizes
technical consulting, primarily in the fields of
accounting, tax planning, financial analysis, appraising,
market analysis, and property management. However,
strategic planning, a relatively new issue for real estate
development firms, is not widely offered by ASREC members.
A review of ASREC's semi-annual publication, Real Estate
Issues for the period 1979 through 1987 confirms that
their focus is more project-specific than organizational
in scope. There were no articles on either organizational
development or human resources management. Development
firms needing advice on strategic planning issues, such as
organizational development and human resources management,
are turning to management consulting firms and independent
counselors.
In summary, the externalities which transformed real
estate development from a conglomeration of
project-to-project deals to a sophisticated industry also
resulted in organizational disequilibrium. In its efforts
to generate order out of chaos through strategic planning,
the industry looked to academic institutions, industrial
organizations and management consultants.
STRATEGIC PLANNING
"Would you tell me, please, which way I
ought to go from here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want
to get to",said the Cat.
"I don't care much where....," said Alice.
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go,"
said the Cat.
".....so long as I get SOMEWHERE,"Alice
added as an explanation.
"Oh, you're sure to do that,"said the
Cat, "if only you walk long enough."
(L.Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland)
Strategic planning, for the purposes of this
research, is defined as the process of making decisions
that establish and maintain the firm's competitive
advantage. Its aim is to achieve a match between the
organization's internal skills, capabilities and resources
on the one hand, and all of the relevant external
considerations on the other. It requires the involvement
and commitment of the top level management of the firm to
determine appropriate goals and to develop an
implementation plan for reaching the goals.
Strategic planning began at the Department of Defense
in World War II, and in academia, at Harvard University in
the 1960's. It reached its height of popularity in the
1970's when the popular press dubbed it the current
corporate fad (Weremiuk, 1987). It later fell into
disfavor among business executives who pointed to its
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failure to ensure survival and continued growth through
the early years of this decade (James, 1984).
Recent literature confirms that strategic planning
as a management methodology continues to have validity
among professionals and academics. It is frequently
couched in terms of organizational development and
behaviorial processes. McGinnis (1984) holds that
strategic planning must be an interactive process
including both analytical issues (e.g., quantitative
analysis) and intuitive issues (e.g., innovation). He
argues that analytical issues impose structure on the
ill-defined internal and external environments, and
intuitive issues permit exploitation of insights developed
by the analytical issues. Figure 1 summarizes the
integration of analysis and intuition in the strategy
formulation process.
FIGURE I INTEGRATION OF ANALYSIS AND INTUITION
------------------ --------------------ANALYSIS (-------------INTUITION
IMPOSE STRUCTURE CREATE OPPORTUNITIES
INTELLIGENCE: INNOVATION:
Environmental Scanning Learn New hays
Internal Monitoring Be Willing to
Communications Bend
ORGANIZATIONAL BALANCE: PROACTIVITY:
Centralized Policy Making Shape the
Decentralized Policy Making Environment
Authority
ANALYSIS: RISK TAKING:
Systematically Evaluate Make Subjective
Problems and Develop Decisions
Array of Responses
-----------------------------
Unstructured Appropriate
Environment ---------------------------------> Rtrategies
(Adapted from McGinnis, 1984, p.48)
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In addition to the interest in changing how managers
practice strategic planning, academics, such as Chris
Argyris at Harvard and Don Schon at MIT, are developing
theories about consulting. Argyris (1985) points out that
both the analytical and collective wisdom approaches to
strategic planning often provoke organizational and
individual defensive routines which inhibit implementation
of strategy. He describes defensive routines as "thoughts
and actions used to protect individuals', groups' and
organizations' usual ways of dealing with reality" (p.5).
In other words, there are strong tendencies to preserve
the status quo. The defensive routines may be productive
(e.g., they protect a present level of competence without
inhibiting learning) or counterproductive (e.g., in order
to protect, they inhibit learning). Consultants need to
learn and teach new competencies for dealing with the
threat of change and improved organizational policies in
order to alter these patterns of defensive routines. (For
detailed methodologies, see Argyris, 1985.) A difficult
challenge in integrated strategic planning is to prevent
polarization of analytical and intuitive issues. Both are
of value.
Strong and skilled leadership is needed to prevent
domination by either analysis or intuition. Integrated
strategic planning implies an ongoing process,
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organizational openness, constant questioning of
underlying assumptions, and the capability to diagnose and
change defensive routines.
Although the concept of strategy has a futuristic
connotation, Mintzberg points out that strategies are both
plans for the future and patterns from the past. He
likens the manager's shaping of strategy to the potter's
crafting a bowl from a lump of clay. (Mintzberg, 1987)
Continued connection between thought and action is
necessary to both endeavors. The notion of emerging
strategies implies organizational flexibility and openness
to change, and suggests that learning by experience is an
ongoing process. Kolb's Experiential Learning Model
(Figure 2) illustrates the connection between abstract
concepts and concrete experience.
Figure 2 THE EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING MODEL
Concrete
Experience
Testing Implications Observations
of Concepts in and
New Situations Reflections
Formation of Abstract Concepts
and Generalizations
Kolb, 1973, p.23)
Kolb's model indicates that learning from experience
should be an explicit objective in organizations. It
concurs with the Mintzberg concept of strategy as both
prospective and retrospective.
In summary, strategic planning requires a combination
of quantitative and qualitative resources. It is a
dynamic activity, both intuitive and analytical, which
steers the organization through change toward growth.
Many real estate developers in the 1980's, confounded by
change on all fronts, have turned to management
consultants for help with strategic decision-making.
THE MANAGEMENT CONSULTING INDUSTRY
Management is, in the end, the most creative
of all arts -- for its medium is human
talent itself. (Robert McNamara)
The last decade witnessed explosive growth in
management consulting. The volume of business of United
States management consulting firms increased from an
average of $1 billion in the 1960's to an estimated $7
billion worldwide in 1987. Over half the firms now
practicing were founded since 1970. (Kennedy, 1987)
Some of the changes in the business resulting from
the rapid growth are:
o Clients' expectations changed. The more
experienced clients are discriminating
consumers who weigh the value-added potential
offered by a consultant.
o Successful specialist consultants must
be seen by their clients as experts in their
fields.
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o Clients seldom rely on one consultant
and often depend on several specialists.
o Sole practicioners (i.e., not affiliated with
a consulting firm) grew in numbers 20% annually
in the period 1979-1984. During the same
period, large, generalist firms held steady or
suffered slight declines, particularly in the
economic downturn of the early 1980's.
(Kelley, 1986)
o Approximately 50% of consulting jobs are
awarded through competitive bids. (Nees and
Greiner, 1985)
o Increased competition in the industry led to
more vigorous marketing by management
consulting firms.
Who are these consultants? What are they selling?
Are they all the same? How does a client choose the
"right" consultant?
Who Are They?
Management consultants can be broadly categorized in
four groups: MBA's who join large consulting firms upon
graduation, mid-career professionals working in larger
consulting companies, retirees between the ages of 45 and
70, and part-time consultants (often academicians).
Between 20-25% of MBA graduates from leading schools
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choose consulting as their first job. 31% of the MBA
graduates from Harvard in 1985 became consultants.
(Kelley 1986)
Consultants work in large, multidisciplinary,
national consulting firms, such as McKinsey, Arthur D.
Little and Booz Allen & Hamilton; smaller, regional or
local firms staffed by specialists; or as independent
specialists. The large firms provide a wide range of
services, prefer large projects with big clients, and
seldom get involved in implementing their recommendations.
Work is often performed by less experienced MBA's who pick
up the project once the engagement has been secured by a
senior partner. (Greiner and Metzger, 1983). At Arthur
D. Little Company, the policy is to prepare new
consultants (generally recent MBA's) through a program of
formal training and mentoring with a senior consultants on
a variety of projects. Other consultants come to the firm
after many years in industry. (Feeley, 1988)
The large firm category includes the big eight
accounting firms which expanded into management consulting
in the last decade and depended on it in 1987 for an
estimated 21% of their total revenues (Kennedy, 1987).
According to a senior executive at Laventhol & Horwath,
most of their management consulting clients are large
development companies or corporate real estate divisions,
often referred by other divisions of L&H. A heated
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debate ensues in the industry, questioning whether
Certified Public Accounting firms are guilty of conflict
of interest when they serve as management consultants to
their audit clients. The accounting firms argue that
their consulting units are organized separately from the
audit function, and they also emphasize their high
professional standards. (Greiner and Metzger, 1983) .
Some of the smaller firms were founded by consultants
after several years working for one of the national or
multi-national firms. For example, in 1977 Howard P.
Smith and Paul L. Donahue left Rohrer, Hibler & Replogle,
Inc. (after 18 and 4 years of service, respectively) to
establish Smith & Donahue, Inc., an organizational
consulting firm. Both men sought more professional
independence and equanimity than they experienced at their
former company. (Donahue, 1988) In their ten years, Smith
& Donahue has grown to a total of six professionals,
including three principals, who are all organization
behavioral specialists. Their clients include real estate
development companies in the Boston and Washington, D.C.
metropolitan areas. They plan to to hire a person with a
management background to broaden the firm's skill base.
Also in the small firm category are academics who
work as management consultants in all industries,
including real estate development. Their consulting work
is closely linked to their research; the engagement
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provides field data, food for thought to build models and
theory. Often an academic selects clients based on the
potential for developing the consultant's "intellectual
capital". The academics generally provide more personal
consultative services and employ innovative,
"cutting-edge" methodologies. Institutions of higher
learning, recognizing the research value of the
engagements, encourage their faculty's consulting
activity.
Relative to the established professions of medicine,
law and acccounting, management consulting is in its
emergent stage. As a profession, it lacks an established
body of knowledge, educational requirements, testing
procedures, an accepted accrediting body, and regulatory
rules for governing conduct. (Greiner and Metzger, 1983)
Organizations of management consultants exist, and they
are working toward standardization and certification in
the industry. In 1987, the Institute of Management
Consultants (IMC), the Association of Management
Consultants, and the Society of Professional Management
Consultants, Inc., merged under the banner of the IMC.
Their combined membership is 2000 (Baron, 1988). It is
expected to take several more decades before there is a
single, universally accepted certification process
(similar to the CPA designation) for management
consultants. (Greiner and Metzger, 1983)
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What Are They Selling?
Management consulting spreads across a spectrum of
industries and services. One industry watchdog reported
that the five most popular services offered by management
consultants today are:
1. Strategic business planning
2. Organizational planning and structure
3. Marketing strategy
4. Management development
5. General Management
(Kennedy, 1987)
Growth has brought change in operations. A senior
executive of a major think-tank consulting firm
commented,
Successful consultants today have to be
concerned with implementation. Gone are the
days of delivering the report and
considering the job done. We need to get
the client to buy in to the program.
(Feeley, 1988)
Implementation of recommendations from the initial
engagement is often the basis for a follow-up proposal and
additional work with the client.
Generally, the large, multidisciplinary firms provide
an array of services to clients concentrated in Fortune
500 companies and large government agencies. The CPA
firms emphasize quantitative types of consulting, such as
information systems and financial analysis of investments.
There are functionally-specialized firms, e.g., Alexander
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Proudfoot Company in manufacturing, which concentrate on a
limited range of services. Industry specialists have a
reputation for knowledge of the complex issues facing a
particular industry, e.g., Theodore Barry & Associates in
utilities. The specialties of small firms and sole
practicioners vary widely. Although the range of services
varies firm-by-firm, management consultants across the
spectrum of the industry often market strategic planning
as one of their specialties.
How Does A Client Find the "Right" Consultant?
The president of one well-established
management consulting firm commented:
The time is long gone when we could ignore
competition. The client doesn't come to
us as easily as before. We have almost
entered the Procter & Gamble era for
selling our services.
(Nees and Greiner, 1985)
Marketing is stressed in the consulting industry.
For example, educational materials used by one of the
large consulting firms emphasize effective negotiating.
The consultants are trained to lead the client through the
stages of decision-making, hopefully toward selection of
their firm. They are coached on how to influence the
decision by restating the client's expressed needs in
terms of the consultant's ability to provide service. The
training materials caution against letting influence
become manipulation. However, the prospective client,
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with little or no skill/experience in selecting management
consultants, may be at a disadvantage when confronted by a
marketing-trained negotiator/consultant.
Four years of research studies in the management
consulting industry offer guidelines for clients seeking
the best match between their needs and a consultant's
service (Nees and Greiner, 1985):
1. Be clear about the problem to be
investigated, i.e. avoid broad
generalizations such as "We have an
information technology problem." The client
should know if he wants help designing a
new information system or help assessing
the future implications of information
technology on the firm.
2. Be aware of your company's working style so
you can anticipate the consultant's affect
on it and adjust accordingly. For example,
top management which makes all decisions
behind closed doors, may have difficulty
working with an organizational development
consultant whose methodologies are not
understood beforehand.
3. Be familiar with various types of
consulting firms and focus your search on
firms which fit your needs. For example,
are you looking for a consultant who
specializes in statistical analysis,
modeling of key variables, problem
identification or another approach? Ask
probing interview questions to learn how
the consultant operates.
4. Use a pluralistic approach in hiring
management consultants. For example,
different consultants can be hired for
various aspects of a major project.
5. Opt for collective decision-making when
selecting a management consultant. By
engaging senior staff in the selection
process, the executive is more likely to
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make a good match.
To what extent do clients adhere to these guidelines?
Holtz (1986) suggests that clients' two primary concerns
in consultant selection are: 1) how will the consultant's
work affect my organization, and 2) how will the decision
to hire this consultant affect my personal welfare? In
other words, the client has both general business and
personal concerns which influence the consultant
selection. Greiner and Metzger (1983) suggest that
political factors may influence the decision to hire a
consultant, e.g., the desire to obtain confirmation for a
tentative diagnosis already made, or to undermine
opposition within executive ranks by using a consultant as
the main proponent for change.
Training materials used by one of the largest
management consulting firms teach that clients' decision
criteria are generally a two-step process. First, the
client (either consciously or unconsciously) identifies
selection criteria and ranks them in importance. For
example, for advice in competitive strategy, industry
experience may be a more critical criterion than having a
local office. Second, the client uses the criteria to
ascertain how well a potential consultant's service
matches his/her need.
The risks in selecting a consultant are high because
the client can judge only in retrospect whether the
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investment was sound. The potential for reward is
proportionate to the risk, however; the right consultant
can save a firm endless hours of grief and a lot of money.
Conversely, the wrong consultant can prolong and confound
problems and waste the firm's money. The client, the real
estate developer, is ultimately responsible for the
selection.
CONSULTING TYPOLOGIES AND PROCESSES
I keep six honest serving men
(They taught me all I knew):
Their names are What and Why and When
and How and Where and Who.
(Rudyard Kipling)
Researchers who study the management consulting
industry categorize consultants for comparative purposes.
Greiner and Nees (1985) group consultants into five
categories: Mental Adventurers, Strategic Navigators,
Management Physicians, System Architects and Friendly
Co-Pilots (See Figure 3.)
Consultants in each category are defined according to
their characteristics in various categories. For example,
mental adventurers (such as Arthur D. Little) have a
scientific knowlege base, are oriented as researchers,
often use a statistical analytical approach, and provide
creative options in the expectation that their clients
will make more knowledgeable decisions. By contrast,
management physicians (such as McKinsey & Company) are
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characteristically knowledgeable in general management,
are diagnosticians, approach the project with an eye
toward problem identification, focus their recommendations
on the organization and its leadership, and expect
improved organizational effectiveness as the
outcome.
Figure 3: CHARACTERISTICS OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTING FIRMS
Mental Strategic Management System Friendly
Adventurer Navigator Physician Architect Co-Pilot
--------2- -- - - -- -----
KNOWLEDGE General Business
BASE Science Economics Management Technology Experience
ROLE TOWARD
CLIENT Researcher Planner Diagnostician Designer Advisor
APPROACH Sounding
TO Statistical Model Key Identify Implement Board
CLIENT Analysis Variables Problems So utions for CEO
EXPECTED More More Improved Better
OUTCOMES Knowledgeable Profitable Organizational Greater CEO
FOR CLIENT Decisions Market Effectiveness Efficiency Judgment
Niche
(Nees and Greiner, 1983)
Greiner and Metzger (1983) contrast process and
content consultants along similar lines. Process
consultants, the "psychiatrists" of the consulting trade,
ask lots of questions, give few specific answers, takes
client through self-examination and self-healing process.
They are criticized by content consultants who say process
consultants abdicate responsibility to their clients. The
content consultants typically take direct action to verify
causes of a problem, write a report with specific
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recommendations, believe they are better-equipped as
outsiders to see problems clearly, and use their technical
knowledge to formulate solutions. Critics call them
overbearing and isolated from their clients.
Consultants are also described as being diagnostic or
implementation-oriented; the former focuses on
identification of causes and recommendations for
corrective action, and the latter tends to be "hands-on"
specialists.
In fact, most consultants are seldom strictly one
type or another. Their approaches and methods often cross
ovdr categorical lines.
There are two basic approaches to analyzing strategic
planning issues: the inside/out, which centers around the
idea that full understanding of internal strengths and
weaknesses can be used to achieve synergy with external
forces. The outside/in approach places greater emphasis
on the external environment's effects on the organization.
Some of the better-known outside/in models and the
firms which pioneered them are the portfolio approach
(Boston Consulting Group,Inc.), the experience/curve model
(Arthur D. Little), and the strategic business unit
(McKinsey & Company). Variations on these models have
been used (with mixed results) by some of the largest
corporations in the world. An article entitled "Playing
by the Rules of the Corporate Strategy Game" (Fortune,
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1979) reviewed many outside/in models and described the
failures of companies which had unsuccessfully employed
them in strategic planning.
Inside/out frameworks include the gap approach model,
developed by the Stanford Research Institute. It compares
a firm's projected earnings at a future point and an
earnings figure extrapolated from the firm's historical
earnings trend. It then develops an action plan to close
the gap. The distinctive competence model, pioneered at
the Harvard Business School, requires the consultant to
identify the client's strengths and management values to
zero in on the client's distinctive competence, i.e., what
can this firm do better than any other?
The "group process" approach is heavily dependent
upon client involvement. With the consultant acting
primarily as a facilitator, managers discuss and confront
strategic issues. For example, the Mason-Mitroff
dialectic model includes steps for uncovering management
assumptions and then creating alternative strategies which
are argued within the total management group.
Questionnaires are used to gather data on assumptions and
opinions of senior managers. The consultant manages the
argumentative process toward consensus on the real issues
and alternative action plans. (Greiner and Metzger, 1983)
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Schein identifies three models of consultation:
1. Purchase of Expertise Model - The most
prevalent model, e.g.,a manager defines a
need and concludes that the organization has
neither time nor resources to fulfill the
need.
2. Doctor-Patient Model - A manager detects
symptoms of a problem, e.g., dropping sales,
and calls the consultant to diagnose the
problem.
3. Process Consultation Model - The manager
defines a need for improvement; the
consultant engages the client in activities
to help perceive, understand and act upon
process events in the organization in order
to improve the situation as defined by the
client.
(Schein, 1988, p.5)
Process consultation contrasts with the other models
in several respects. In the standard models, the
consultant is the expert, the consummate problem-solver.
In process consultation, the starting premise is that with
help the organization will eventually know best how to
solve its problems, but it may not know how to use its
resources effectively. The expertise of the process
consultant is the ability to help the organization to
solve its own problems through raising awareness and
teaching problem-solving skills. The consultant is the
facilitator.
In process consultation, the consultant leads the
client (top management) through a series of retreats and
planning sessions to develop its own action plan. The
agenda for the retreat is developed from data the
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consultant gathers within the organiation.
Another approach to consulting is to view it as a
heirarchy of objectives which are achieved to varying
degrees by different types of consultants (Figure 4). The
objectives are arranged in pyramidal form. Traditional
purposes of consulting are listed 1 through 5, additional
goals, 6 through 8.
Figure 4 A HEIRARCHY OF CONSULTING PURPOSES
8. Improve Organizational Effectiveness
7. Facilitate Client Learning
6. Build Consensus and Commitment
5. Assist Implementation
4. Provide Recommendations
3. Conduct Diagnosis That May Redefine Problem
2. Provide Solution to a Given Problem
1. Provide Requested Information
Turner (1932, p. 122)
Movement up the pyramid toward loftier purposes
requires a higher degree of process consultation skills
and management of the client-consultant relationship by
both parties. At the higher objectives, consultants
require evidence of the client's readiness and commitment
to change, and broader access to the organization. The
engagement becomes increasingly collaborative from
objectives 1 through 8. Achieving the highest purposes
entails strong client involvement (and commitment of time,
personal energy, and money) and more emphasis on process.
The relationship between the client and the
consultant begins with the decision to engage a consultant
and continues until a contractual termination point, or
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until ended by one or the other. Some firms maintain an
"on call" relationship with a consultant. Figure 5
illustrates the stages in a typical, singular engagement
between a top-level manager-client and a consultant.
Figure 5 THE LIEN lIAN~REATINRRIP
STEP I ----------------- )RECOGNITION OF NEED
External Environmient?Organizational Disequilibrium?
STEP 2 ----------------- )ENGAGEMENT DECISION
Skills/Needs Match?
Personal References?
Client Experience?
Other Criteria?
STEP 3 ----------------->ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITY
Product-oriented?
Process-oriented?
STEP 4 ----------------- )ENGASEMENT EVALUATION
More profitability?
Improved process?
Other Cr iteria?
The client controls the relationship and has the
opportunity to maximize the return on the dollars invested
in consulting services. In the following discussion of
the model, consider that the client is.the CEO of a real
estate development firm.
A "problem" is usually the catalyst for Step #1. The
problem may be rooted in the external environment, e.g., a
new requirement for detailed and costly geotechnical
studies as a prerequisite for obtaining a building permit;
or, it might be defined within the firm, e.g., three of
the firm's project managers resigning to take positions at
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competing firms. It is important for the client to
carefully examine and define the "problem". Often, the
originally defined "problem" is merely a symptom of a much
larger issue. In the previous example, the exodus of
three project managers could be symptomatic of a larger
organizational problem, e.g., job dissatisfaction or
inappropriate recruitment and selection practices.
The client's actions during Step #2, Engagement
Decision, result in either the "right" or "wrong"
consultant being selected. Just as a manager is unlikely
to hire an electrical engineer to complete the
geotechnical studies, so, too, should a CEO think twice
about hiring a CPA to consult on a human-resource,
communication problem. Often CEOs rely on their
colleagues' recommendations when selecting a consultant.
Although personal references are an important criterion in
the selection process, the emphasis should be on matching
a consultant's skills with the firm's needs. Accurate
identification of those needs requires the participation
of several managers in the firm, particularly when the
scope of problem is more organizational than
project-specific.
Who should be involved in the engagement activities?
The client needs to ensure that the scope of Step #3,
Engagement Activities, is appropriate to solving the
organization's problem. The organizational involvement
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will be much narrower when the consultant's efforts are
oriented toward product delivery (e.g., project-specific
geotechnical studies) than when they are process-oriented
(e.g., toward higher levels of job satisfaction.)
Knowing one's expectations facilitates Step #4,
Evaluation of Engagement. Evaluation is tied to the
recognition of need which prompted the engagement.
Although the final and most thorough evaluation of the
engagement occurs ex post facto, consultants and clients
can agree to conduct periodic evaluations as part of Step
#3, Engagement Activities. The absence of evaluation
seriously limits the learning opportunities for both
client and consultant.
What does the model illustrate? It shows that the
client can make implicit or explicit choices at several
steps during an engagement with the consultant. The
implication is that the client can and should thoughtfully
and explicitly manage the relationship with the consultant
to facilitate the growth of the organization and maximize
returns on the firm's investment in the
consultant.
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CHAPTER 2
FIELD INVESTIGATIONS
Chapter 2 focuses on the field work component of the
research. The Client/Consultant Relationship Model
described in Chapter 1 is the framework for presentation
of data from three sites.
SELECTION of RESEARCH SITES
The following attributes are common to the three sites:
o The client is active in real estate
development as a principal in the firm.
o The client firm has been in business for
at least five years.
o The client has engaged a management
consultant for help with a strategic
planning issue within the last three years.
o The consultant is either affiliated with
an established management consulting firm or
is an academic engaged in independent
consulting.
o The consultant and client agreed to
separate interviews with the researcher.
o The client's problem was related to
organizational growth.
o All sites are in the Boston metropolitan
area.
o All the consultants hold Ph.D's.
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The sites differ in the following respects:
o They range in staff size from 14 to 120.
o The range of asset value owned, managed or
under construction (1980 through June 1988)
is $55 million to $10 billion.
o The CEO's at two sites have MBA's; at the
third, the CEO has a Master of Architecture
degree.
METHODOLOGY
Face-to-face interviews were conducted at all sites
with the CEO of the firm. Two of the consultants were
interviewed in person; the third, by telephone.
Additional face-to-face interviews were conducted with
three experts in the management consulting field.
The same series of questions were posed to clients
and consultants. Follow-up questions necessary for
clarification or elaboration varied slightly from site to
site. Interview transcripts were reviewed by clients and
consultants to ensure data accuracy and completeness.
Copies of written documentation from the engagement were
gathered whenever possible; however, in no case was data
requested or provided from the consultant without the
consent of the client.
The scope of the field work did not include
interviews with personnel other than the CEO at each firm.
There are two parties (one client, one consultant)
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case, an "*" follows the pseudonym the first time it is
used.
SITE #1: MILESTONE PROPERTIES CORPORATION
Client:
Barry D. Libert, President of Milestone Properties
Corporation, founded it in 1980. A multifaceted
development and investment organization, Milestone has
more than 1350 residential units and nearly 160,000 s.f.
of commercial space in four New England metropolitan
markets. Recently, Milestone sold half of its asset base,
subcontracted its property management, and reduced
employment from 95 to 14 employees.
Libert holds an MBA from Columbia University (1977)
and a BA from Tufts University (1975). Prior to entering
real estate, he was with McKinsey & Company as a
management consultant and with Richardson-Vicks as a
product manager.
Consultant:
Timothy Leland* is a management consultant at The
Boston Consulting Group, Inc. (BCG) and served as Team
Leader for the Milestone engagement. He holds a Ph.D in
economics from the University of Pennsylvania and came to
BCG three years ago after several years on the faculty at
Tufts and Boston Universities. Most of his work is with
clients in the health care and real estate fields.
The Boston Consulting Group, Inc. maintains offices
worldwide. It achieved a dominant position in the 1970's
with its innovative "growth-share matrix" model. (Kelley,
1986)
Recognition of Need
In the last analysis, growth depends on the
commitment, consistency and creativity of
the CEO himself. The most powerful
innovations often lie in the application of
new ideas, rather in their origination.
(Philip Evans, V.P., BCG, 1987)
Libert used to work side-by-side with his brother, a
graduate of Amherst College and Harvard Business School,
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who asked that their real names be disguised. In each
who was a management consultant at BCG before going into
real estate at Milestone in 1984. When he left after
three years, Libert was affected. He explained:
My brother and I had different ways of
looking at things. We played off each
other. He took the macro approach and I'm
more of a micro person. When we broke up
the relationship, I lost that balance. It
was more difficult to make decisions about
where the company was going.
In the face of a softening market, Libert focused on
the "organizational strengths" and corporate culture at
Milestone. By organizational strengths, he meant the
competitive position of Milestone relative to other real
estate organizations. He wanted to consider "themes and
options" for the company. Milestone was then a
multi-faceted firm which acquired, constructed and managed
properties. He called it a "conflicted culture" and
explained:
The "blue collar" professionals in the construction
and property management divisions and "white collar"
professionals in the investment division didn't want
to mix. There was friction. Although I tried to
get everybody to work well together, it did not seem
to work.
Frustrated in June 1987, he decided to get outside
advice.
Engagement Decision
Libert considers McKinsey and BCG to be "two of the
best companies around.....not just in the consulting
business....in any business". Therefore, the choice of
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consultant was easy for him. BCG was chosen because it
has a greater presence in Boston than McKinsey. Were any
other consultants considered? "No."
Milestone had used BCG before. Leland recalled
getting this assignment:
With Milestone and BCG, it's hard to know
where one engagement ends and another
begins. For each issue, though, BCG lets
the client define where he wants to go in
the engagement. In 1987, Milestone was
starting to feel increased competition.
Deals were few and further between and
harder to make. They wanted to know what
direction they should go in. One of our
V.P.'s made the agreement and then I moved
in as team leader.
Libert said there was no written agreement because he
and the partners at BCG had a mutual understanding of the
consulting profession, its mission, likely results, and
attendant costs. Libert:
It was to be an interactive process, not a
highly-structured study.... not a written
report, perhaps no documentation. They
would meet with us regularly to develop
themes and options.
Engagement Activities
Libert gave Leland full access to the organization.
They met regularly. Libert regretted not having more time
to spend on the process. The meetings were generally
one-on-one. Other managers did not regularly attend.
Leland described his approach:
At BCG the approach is different than it was
a decade ago. There is still a "bag of
tricks", so to speak, to analyze problems,
but there is an additional emphasis on
helping the client understand exactly what
business he's in, and to help him make
judgments accordingly. Clients demand
different relationships with consultants
these days.....far beyond external studies.
BCG wants the client to decide what action
to take; it wouldn't be productive for us to
make decisions and then for the client to
ignore them.
At those meetings, Leland delivered and sought
reactions to data about Milestone and their competitors.
The internal data, collected from various personnel to
identify the firm's profit centers, emphasized financial
analysis. Were employees resistant about sharing data?
Leland:
They were extremely cooperative. Often I'd
be greeted by them telling me "Oh, yes,
Libert said you'd be coming by". The
atmosphere at Milestone is fairly informal.
As I got data, I'd share it with Libert, so
he participated in shaping the engagement,
in deciding where we'd go next.
Leland used data gathered externally to determine how
Milestone stacked up against its competition in terms
variables such as capital, profitability, and size. When
options were discussed, Leland asked, metaphorically, if
Libert wanted to be more like an insurance company (which
functions on volume and gets a small level of value added
over a long-term commitment), or an investment banker
(which functions with smaller volume, shorter-term, higher
value-added activities). Libert opted for investment
banking. The implication of the decision was to reduce
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staff.
The engagement lasted through the summer of 1987.
Leland said BCG's report to Libert presented findings from
the data gathered both outside and inside the firm: where
Milestone makes its money, which are the most sensitive
cost areas and which of their various businesses (property
management, construction, deal-making) they wanted to be
in.
Evaluation of Engagement
Libert considered his overall relationship with the
consultant, and ranked it a 7 to 8 on a 10-point scale,
with 10 being a highly successful engagement. He said it
would be a 10 if he had the capital to use BCG more
frequently because they provide skills Milestone cannot
maintain on its own. He was satisfied with the outcome of
the summer 1987 engagement, i.e., the strategic decisions
he subsequently made. "I wish I'd made them earlier." The
easiest part of the engagement was the communication with
BCG. He explained:
This is not alien to us. We speak their
language. The focus is more on process than
product. We're probably one of their
favorite clients....we're disciplined and
the interaction comes easy, and we know real
estate is basically no different than any
other kind of firm.
What was difficult? Libert did not hesitate: "the
conclusion." After having laid out ambitious growth plans
six months earlier, he said that there were "bruised egos"
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when he made the decision to shrink the company. He has
no doubt that it was the right decision, however. Did BCG
help with the implementation? "No, I did that myself."
Leland also ranked the engagement above average and
gave it a 7. Why not higher? He explained:
It's a question of how high is the mountain,
how great is the challenge. There was a
high level of cooperation at Milestone, ease
in data-gathering, making it a relatively
hassle-free engagement. At Milestone, if
Libert wants it moved, it gets moved. Thus,
the overall level of satisfaction for the
consultant is lower than when he has to
overcome greater obstacles to complete the
engagement.
Leland deemed the engagement highly successful in
terms of the level of implementation of recommendations
and the value added to the Milestone. How is value
defined? Leland:
At BCG, it includes accounting value, i.e.
profitability of the client's firm, and
other values defined by the client. These
other values may include effects on people
in the organization. For example, the
client may caution a consultant not to
"explode my organization." I've never seen a
client who is without an aspect of loyalty
to the people who work for him. We were
successful at Milestone because we helped
Libert make decisions. We created an
atmosphere and provided the data to allow
him to do that. We added value.
In retrospect Leland would have spent more time in
the beginning of the engagement with Libert to clarify
what he was willing to do with the organization, i.e.,
"how far he was willing to go with the company?" Leland
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believes it would have been better to talk more generally
about issues with Libert and the vice presidents to scope
out possibilities for organizational change.
SITE #2: COPLEY REAL ESTATE ADVISORS
Client:
Joseph W. O'Connor, CEO, Copley Real Estate Advisors,
("Copley"), formerly a vice president in charge of
mortgage and real estate at New England Life Insurance
Company, has been president of Copley (an affiliate of The
New England), since he formed it in 1982. He holds a B.A.
in economics from the College of the Holy Cross (1967) and
an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School (1972).
Copley's unique investment strategy emphasizes
developmental joint-venturing. The firm consists of 120
people and manages real estate assets whose market value
exceeds $10 billion.
Consultant:
Neal Thornberry, president of Impact Strategies, a
consulting firm specializing in organizational
development, is also an associate professor in the
department of management and organizational behavior at
Babson College in Wellesley, Massachusetts. He has a
bachelor degree from Case Western University, and master
and doctorate degrees in organizational psychology from
Bowling Green State University.
Thornberry prefers working with entrepreneurial
companies at a crossroads stage of growth. His specialty
is management training programs; he enjoys helping
individual contributors become managers.
Recognition of Need
When you look at what makes Copley tick, it
is a highly focused philosophy, one that we
apply consistently. The philosophy stresses
a proven investment strategy, people,
relationships, and knowing what we do well.
Perhaps most importantly, we stress people.
(O'Connor,1987)
In the spring of 1987, O'Connor agreed to having a
team of graduate students from the MIT Center for Real
Estate Development, as part of their work for a course
entitled "Managing the Development Effort", research and
prepare a case study on Copley Real Estate Advisors. The
case highlighted some employee dissatisfaction and
uneasiness. On the one hand, it portrayed O'Connor as
extremely intelligent, highly motivated, and
fun-loving--the consummate deal maker-- revered by his
staff. On the other hand, the data also indicated a
rising level of frustration among employees striving to
emulate a leader from whom they felt increasingly
distanced. The implication was that O'Connor and his
senior staff needed to spend more time managing the
organization.
Introspection about the firm is not foreign to
Copley's senior staff. In the past, O'Connor prepared
agendas and organized two retreats for discussions of
corporate growth issues. 3 1/2 years ago the group of 10
gathered to assess Copley's performance as a young
company. Two years later, they focused on the
implications of Copley's growth. There was consensus that
bureaucracy should be shunned and informality nurtured.
The MIT case study was completed as O'Connor was
making plans for the third Copley retreat. (See Appendix
A: Preliminary Agenda Memorandum.)
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I knew generally what the agenda items should
be. But the MIT study really brought them
home to me. The big issue was how do we
adapt the company to the growth in size.
Engagement Decision
In the past, retreat discussions were facilitated by
someone outside the firm. Disappointed by the
ineffectiveness of the first retreat facilitator (an
inhouse consultant at The New England), O'Connor engaged
an independent consultant to facilitate the second retreat
in 1985. He recalled that experience:
He was terrible! He'd begin to give us
his opinions instead of just facilitating.
A couple of times I had to say to him,
"Hey, listen, when we want your opinions,
we'll ask for them. Your job is to be a
facilitator. We're interested in our
opinions here, not yours."
O'Connor asked his senior staff to submit names of
prospective facilitators for the 1987 two-day retreat,
booked for Nantucket. Thornberry remembers the call:
I was told O'Connor was looking for a
facilitator, someone to come in and run a
meeting on Nantucket. My first reaction
was negative; it didn't sound like a good
idea.....too high risk for a consultant,
going in without knowing the players. Too
many hidden agendas. I was prepared to
talk myself out of a job. I told O'Connor
I'd only do the work if I first had access
to the organization, to interview and
collect data. We talked. I described the
research-intervention-action model I use.
(See Appendix B: Diagrammatic Model for
Action Research.) He agreed the approach
made sense. I could see they were an
action-oriented company; they wanted to
get something done.
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Thornberry, atypically cavalier with O'Connor in
specifying his requirements for the data collection,
expected resistance. Once convinced that the consultant
had experience in facilitating, however, O'Connor agreed
to the methodology and gave Thornberry full access to the
organization.
I talked with a few consultants. I didn't
want another one like we had at the last
retreat! I liked Thornberry. He was
easy-going, but very focused. He was casual
and he'd done this kind of thing before. I
wanted somebody who knew about
organizational issues. And we wanted input
from all people in the organization. I told
him what was on the agenda...the issues were
an outgrowth of the MIT case.....How do we
manage the growth of the company? What
changes should we make? How do people move
up in the company? How can we put jobs in
stages?
.... I told him I wanted a facilitator
and an umpire. That was the most important
ground rule. I liked his idea about data
gathering. He had full access to the
organization. I stayed out of it. It was
important that everyone in the company knew
they had input. And I wanted an action
plan; that was a goal.
O'Connor described the agreement as "very informal".
Thornberry used a letter of agreement for all his
engagements.
I write out what I propose to do, the client
endorses it and that's it. I agreed to
collect data, sort it, give it back,
facilitate a discussion toward action
recommendations. I require access to the
organization, the support and involvement of
top level executives and involvement in the
formulation of solution outcomes. I hate
meetings where people sit around and talk
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about what's wrong with no action plan
coming out of the meeting. Implementation
is very important to me.
Engagement Activities
Thornberry's initial impression was that O'Connor
felt the pressure and dissatisfaction in his company and
that he was really concerned about losing staff. What
were the staff's concerns?
Using his fairly standardized format, Thornberry
interviewed, one-on-one, a cross-section of the firm from
top-level to support employees.
It was a job satisfaction/needs analysis in
which I asked people to describe the working
climate at Copley by using metaphors, e.g.,
"Working here is like working at........"
(See Appendix C: Thornberry Data,
Representative Comments.)
Once I assured them of complete
confidentiality, they talked quite openly.
My rule is to report only data results,
never individual sources. That's critical
to getting good data in this process.
Data collection was completed within two weeks. Then
Thornberry formatted it into areas of concern for the
retreat. The critical issues were career paths,
compensation, and organizational structure. O'Connor was
briefed on the data and then issued a final retreat
memorandum to senior staff. (See Appendix D.) The group
of 17 flew to Nantucket on Wednesday, June 10th.
There, Thornberry asked them to form three groups of
people with various levels of authority and experience.
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Each group was given the list of concerns prepared from
the cross-sectional data and instructed to prioritize them
for an action plan. Thornberry:
I floated around serving as a facilitator,
but they didn't need much prodding... these
were not shy peoplel O'Connor doesn't mean
to, but he intimidates them. He's very
bright and he wants action. Like so many
entrepreneurs at this stage of growth, he
needs to let go, but he's finding it very
difficult. It's a control issue.
O'Connor recalled the group discussions:
We reviewed the list of issues, 7 or 8, I
think, and we had to prioritize them. We
talked a lot about which were the most
important for everybody in the company and
decided to focus on employee satisfaction,
employee motivation and employee career
development. Everybody had an equal voice.
At first the newer people who had never been
on retreat held back a little, but soon
enough they opened up.
From time to time, Thornberry would display one
of the metaphors from the data, e.g., Copley is like "a
three ring circus - only quality performers need apply",
and ask for comments from the group. Thornberry:
Usually, the person who had given me that
particular data would close right up, not
even comment on it, let alone own up to
having said it. That same person might have
shrugged off my pledge of confidence during
the data-gathering, saying "Oh, I can tell
O'Connor anything... we're very open at
Copley".
Thornberry recalled that the participants chose the
issues of career development and management skills for
action plans. Working in one group, they targeted the
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following areas for action plans: job descriptions, career
paths, differentiation among four levels of authority.
His instructions to them were straightforward:
I told them it was their job to create the
action plans. There was a need to give
employees ground rules. The data showed
that there is a growing level of politics in
the company. It used to be that if you
wanted something, you could holler across
the room to get O'Conner. You can't do that
anymore, so if you don't have visibility,
you've got to find another way to get to
him. That's where the politics come in.so
people have to find some other way to get
his attention.
There was a cooperative spirit throughout, but
Thornberry's difficulty as a facilitator was ensuring that
O'Connor did not dominate. Thornberry said: "O'Conner
speaks and everyone else stops and listens."
How did the session end? Although originally
scheduled to be confined for two full days, the group, led
by O'Connor, opted to wind up their work early. As
Thornberry described:
Two thirds through the second day, it was clear they
all wanted to play. They play as hard as they work.
Joe said, "OK, this is what I think we ought to
do..." and then he summarized the discussions.... and
we wound up the proceedings. Then it was play time.
Evaluation of Engagement
Both O'Connor and Thornberry were satisfied with the
process and results of the retreat, though not equally.
O'Connor ranked it most favorably, 9.5 to 10, on a scale
of 1 to 10. On what basis did O'Connor measure success?
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By what's changed! There's a change of
attitude in house, an awareness of the need
to be managers. We came out of there with
action plans. (Exhibit E) We set up
committees to work on the issues that were
raised. There are small groups with no
senior people, representing a cross-section
of the company. I get feedback each week.
I tell my senior people we have to be better
managers and their compensation is tied to
that. It's not easy, but it's fun, too.
O'Connor cited specific changes generated by the
action plans and committee work, e.g., the institution of
flex time and establishment of a new personnel committee
which provides feedback for the executive committee's
weekly meetings. He uses the "constant dialogue" among all
staff levels to set the agenda for the Fall 1988 retreat:
decision-making authority and responsibility. Given a
chance to revisit the 1987 retreat, would he do anything
differently? No, he believes it worked well. He said that
more data-gathering would be done for the next retreat.
With a facilitator? No, he believes they can do that
themselves, based on the new scope of dialogue in the
company.
When asked to recall the easiest and most difficult
aspects of the Thornberry engagement, O'Connor tilted his
head, chuckled heartily and retorted:
Easy? None of it was easy! It's hard work,
physically draining, being on retreat. The
hardest part was arranging it all, getting
the agenda worked out.
jranking was lower, a 7.5 to 8 out of a possible 10.
It was a lot of fun! I operate a lot on
personal relationships, and I really liked
working with these people.... they're very
bright, they have a bias toward action. And
it was successful....they developed action
plans and later on, O'Connor announced those
plans at a quarterly meeting of all
employees. Another thing, there was no
hassle about money, as there often is when
the work load expands and fees go up based
on the client's requests. When there are
problems like that, the general level of
cooperation goes down. But there were no
problems at Copley.
He believes he had a significant impact on the
organization, particularly with lower level employees. As
he explained:
I helped empower them. They were able to
tell their side of the story through me. I
was their ombudsman.
Why, then, the lower ranking? Thornberry explained:
Well, I wished we could have arranged a
longer-term relationship. The company needs
to develop a management training program.
The managers need training on how to give
feedback and direction. I mentioned that to
O'Connor when we talked last week and he
said "Yeah, we're thinking about it." They
resist because they're afraid of being
bureaucratic like The New England. They
need to go slowly, to have simultaneous
loose-tight controls. Strategic planning
isn't for the long term anymore; it's the
action you plan for the next six months.
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Thornberry's recollections were also positive, but his
Client:
William R. Minder, President, Branham Builders, Inc.,
received a B.S. from MIT and an M.S. in Architecture from
Yale University. He entered the development profession in
1959 constructing vacation homes in Colorado. In 1974, he
formed the Branham partnership with Kathleen Martin and
another architect. Martin has an M.S. in Architecture
from the MIT. Since 1980, Branham completed a total of
152 residential units and 110,000 s.f. of commercial space
with a combined sales price exceeding $52 million. In
July 1988, four projects totaling 365 residential units
and 30,000 s.f. commercial space, with a combined market
value in excess of $95 million were under construction.
There are 37 employees at Branham.
Consultant
Dr.Chris Argyris is the James Bryant Conant Professor of
Education and Organizational Behavior at the Harvard
University Graduate School of Education. His studies have
focused on how people learn. His current research focuses
on consultants and the consulting industry. He is the
author of numerous scholarly articles and books, among
which are "Skilled Incompetence" (Harvard Business Review,
September/October 1986), and Strategy, Change and
Defensive Routines (Ballinger, 1985).
Recognition of Need
We were having trouble with what the owners'
role should be. Up until then we were a "Ma
and Pa" organization, but we were also
growing. (Minder)
In 1986 Branham Builders was stretched to the limit
with more active projects than at any time in their
history. Minder recalled the increasing levels of
tension:
The difficulties were in project
management.... was the project manager (PM) a
decision-maker or merely a paper shuffler?
The PM's were all architects. There were
questions of ownership of ideas and of the
firm. Martin and I, as partners-in-charge
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of projects, wanted a part in design
decisions.
Architect Noel Germain, an experienced project
manager and a minority partner (with a 6-T interest), was
responsible for hiring and monitoring the PM's, and also
served as a PM. The majority partners, Minder and Martin,
zealously upheld Branham's reputation for high quality and
affordability and found it hard to delegate
responsibility. The parallel increases in work load and
the number of project managers confounded the
organization. There were no job descriptions delineating
roles and responsibilities. Communications broke down;
inefficiency rose. Minder described the emergent
problems:
One problem was bad business judgement,
e.g., a PM's lack of sensitivity in speaking
with town officials on zoning problems.
Another was technical screw-ups by PM's,
e.g. failure to ensure sound insulation in
buildings. Who was really responsible for
dealing with the PM's, Germain (as technical
head) or Martin (as project head)?
The partners and managers agreed that Branham needed
help. They decided to hire a consultant to help them
define roles and lines of authority.
Engagement Decision
Two out of the four consultants contacted, Arryris
and one of the large management consulting firms, were
asked to make presentations. (Minder first learned. of
Argyris' work when he was a graduate student at Yale, and
Argyris was on the faculty there. When problems arose at
Branham, Minder recalled Argyris' work in behavioral
psychology and decided to contact him.) Each consultant
addressed a meeting of the partners, controller, financial
officer and project managers. The management consultant
firm was rejected. According to Minder:
They were accustomed to dealing with much
larger clients. They had a "cookie-cutter"
approach and offered packaged solutions. We
are a unique firm, not suited to that kind
of consulting.
Argyris, on the other hand, was enthusiastically
received. Minder described his presentation as "exciting,
inspiring", and said all the managers felt that working
with Argyris could be personally and individually
rewarding. Minder:
We wanted him to show us a path. We didn't
understand how to move forward. We expected
to tell him our troubles like a "shrink".
In considering potential clients, Argyris looks for
research opportunities to collect data relevant to his work.
Clients are generally not accepted unless they add to his
"capital stock of knowledge." His current work is developing
theories about effective consulting and most of his clients
are consulting companies. Argyris was attracted to
Branham:
I saw a young, small organization which
wanted to use job descriptions to avoid
becoming "rigidicized" in the future. I
knew that unless they dealt with their
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defensive routines, they wouldn't be able to
prevent problems in the future.
He insisted on describing his consultative process
to the entire group of managers because he "didn't want
to have any one of them think they had me in their hip
pocket". And what did he pledge to do for them?
I told them I'd meet with them to discuss
their worries about the future, e.g., why
did they think job descriptions would solve
their problems? I would monitor how they
dealt with each other by first identifying
the defensive routines they used and then
helping them change those routines so they
could get on with structuring job
descriptions.
Argyris told Branham they could either hire
so-called experts to define their roles or they could let
him help them do it themselves. Was he promising to give
them insight?
It was more than that. Insight can give one
knowledge, but knowledge can be used
counterproductively. It's not enough for
them to understand their problems; they have
to move one step further to change the
status quo. The value added comes from
developing solutions in ways that go beyond
insight.
It was agreed that the number of meetings would
depend on both the issues raised for discussion and
Argyris' time constraints. His other commitments forced a
limited scope of work at Branham. Argyris:
This was bypass intervention. Although
Branham had a lot of organizational problems
as a company in transition, direct
intervention in those problems was foregone
for now. Our meetings would circumvent
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those problems and focus on the job
description problems cited by the client.
Engagement Activities
Argyris has a standard "l minute/4 hour" ground rule,
i.e., at any time in the engagement, either the consultant
or the client can, with a minute's notice, end the
proceeding. Then, up to 4 hours is available for either
party to explore the reasons for failure, but not to try
to persuade the other party to resume the proceeding.
Five or six meetings of the partners, controller,
financial officer, and project managers were held, usually
in the conference room at Branham. Each lasted one to
three hours and dealt with a particular issue, e.g.
Germain's interaction with the PM's. Minder called the
meetings "gripe sessions". He recalled how Argyris probed
and intervened through follow-up questions, such as "Are
you paying attention to what X just said?" and, "Are you
really open to hearing X's comments?" and, "Do you have
resistance to what X is telling you?". Minder:
Argyris looked particularly for resistance
points; and he used the transcript to point
out our resistance points. He taught us
how to phrase our thoughts differently.
For example, there's a world of difference
between saying "You're not doing that
right", and saying "It seems to me there
might be another approach." We used to
demonstrate a lot of antagonism toward each
other; sometimes we yelled and screamed.
Now there's not much yelling and there's a
lot less stress.
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On two occasions, Martin and Minder wanted to discuss
their difficulties with Germain's performance. Argyris
insisted that either Germain be present or be informed
that he would be discussed. Germain came to those
meetings and Argyris believes all three were satisfied
with the discussions.
Argyris taped the sessions, transcribed the tapes,
and organized the data for feedback to Branham at the next
meeting. For example, he would decribe typical defensive
routines, such as mixed messages, and cite examples from
the transcript. Argyris recalled one meeting:
Two managers had come to Branham from large
firms. They wanted to manage their part of
Branham's business. But, Minder and Martin
didn't want to be left out of professional
decisions, though they weren't interested in
day-to-day routines. It took several
discussions and a lot of facilitating on my
part for the managers to say they couldn't
trust the partners to leave them alone. I
asked why they equated trust with
distancing. The managers simply wanted
"hands off". The deeper problem, it
surfaced, was they feared their own lack of
ability. What if they made a mistake in
full view of the partner? It turns out that
the bureaucracy they left in the big firms
was in fact the source of their comfort.
The structure and rigidity suited them
better. Branham wasn't the problem; they
were the wrong people for the
jobs.
(The two managers have since left Branham.)
The engagement ended by mutual consent after
four or five sessions to define roles. Both Argyris' time
constraints and Minder's limited financial resources
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influenced the termination decision.
EVALUATION OF ENGAGEMENT
Minder gave the engagement a ranking of 8 to 9. Did
he enjoy it? The easiest part was working with Argyris,
described as "charismatic, fun, stimulating"; and the
hardest was that Argyris "left us with no easy answers,
just the means to solve our own problems." Minder knows
it's a continuing process:
We wanted to get away from being a Ma & Pa
organization and to use the PM's. Argyris
didn't do that specifically for us, but he
set a tone for being aware of ourselves, of
having an interest in the other person's
point of view, of avoiding the "digging in
heels" problem. He helped us realize we are
fully empowered to change the organization,
and he gave us a sense of doing that through
improved communication techniques. He
concentrated on how we interacted; now we
concentrate on that, too. We're less
judgemental.
There are weekly managers meetings at Branham now.
The project management function has been further refined:
each project has a development manager (DM) and a
production manager (PM). Minder:
It struck me that this arrangement (new PM
roles) might work. So, I drew it up and
presented it at a managers' meeting. It
took us six months of discussion to reach
consensus on the new roles, but it's
working.
How influential was Argyris in the redesign of the
project management function? Minder explains:
The PM/DM system really evolved after
Argyris and was a result of our own efforts.
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The agreements reached with Argyris did not
really solve the problem. He helped in the
area of our corporate education. If the
project management problem is now solved, we
solved it.
Argyris ranked the engagement a 9 (out of 10). He
noted the limited objectives and the relative shortness of
the engagement. He described Branham as "open, cordial,
accepting of personal responsibility, and demonstrating a
willingness to work hard to fulfill their stewardship." He
believes he provided the promised value added because
"they learned to identify their defensive routines" and to
change their behavior. He was satisfied, also, with the
data for his research. What did the Branham experience
teach him? Argyris:
It taught me that the control systems, such
as accountability, which people often claim
to dislike the most, are the ones they tend
to hang on to the longest. In firms like
Branham, it's really hard to define turf at
the upper levels where there is a lot of
overlap. So, it's important to bolster job
descriptions with the means to confront how
operations are going. A job description is
a means of protection. First, they had to
deal with what they wanted to protect, and
why they needed protection, and from whom.
Then they could build in mechanisms, e.g.,
rules for discussions among levels of
authority, so they can accommodate those
needs on an ongoing basis.
The Branham engagement also confirmed Argyris'
general beliefs about professional organizations (such as
Branham): they provide a service distinctly different from
the goods of a manufacturing company; 2) the service is
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never turned over to the client as a manufactured
product is; and 3) the client has continual control.
Argyris summarized the challenge for Branham:
How does the firm detect and correct its
errors? How do you reduce the control
mechanisms, e.g., the accountability, which
inhibit learning, in order to better craft
the service?
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CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS of FIELD DATA
Chapter 3 analyzes the consulting engagements at the
three real estate development companies presented in
Chapter Two. The Client/Consultant Relationship Model
introduced in Chapter 1 (Figure 4) is the framework for
the analysis. The central question is: to what extent do
the activities at the sites conform to the models and
theories developed in academic literature? In particular,
the analysis focuses on the level of process consultation
at each site.
It is important to note that the analysis is based on
one client/consultant relationship at each site. The
following discussion should not be construed as an
analysis of the firms' overall relationships with their
consultants.
DECISION-MAKING BASES
Clients can make explicit or implicit decisions at each
step in the client/consultant relationship to make it
more, or less, process-oriented. Figure 6 summarizes the
bases on which the three real estate developers proceeded
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through the four steps at each site. Primary factors are
indicated by "Xp"; secondary factors, "Xs".
Fiqure 6 BASES FOR CLIENT/CONSULTANT ACTIVITIES
MILESTONE COPLEY BRANHAM
RECOGNITION OF NEED
External Environment XpOr.aniz. Disequilibrium Xp Xp
ENGAEMENT DECISION
Skills/Needs Match Xp XpPersonal References
Client Experience Xs Xs Xs
Other Criteria Xp
ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITY
Product-oriented Xp
Process-oriented Xp Xp
ENGAGEMENT EVALUATION
More Profitability Xp
Improved process Xp XP
Other Criteria
KEY: Xp=primary factor, Xs=secondary factor
RECOGNITION OF NEED
The need to formulate a growth strategy is common to
the three sites; the approaches are quite different.
Branham and Copley focus on assessing their firms'
internal systems; Milestone is primarily interested in
assessing external factors. For example, Libert's
definition of "organizational strength" is couched in
market terms,i.e., he wants to know how Milestone stacks
up against its competitors in total assets, and ability to
raise financial capital. His analytical,
external-focused, approach seems inconsistent with the
integrative approach to strategic planning proposed by
McGinnis (see Figure 1). It is reminiscent of many
development firms' modus operandi in the 1970's. Libert's
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interest in devising "themes and options" sounds visionary
and qualitative. However, the emphasis on quantitative
analysis to identify the firm's internal strengths (its
profit centers) seems to ignore the human resources and
systems, key factors in the firm's overall ability to
compete in the marketplace. Perhaps Milestone should also
compare itself with the competition in terms of human
capital.
Libert wants his consultant to be a surrogate
brother. He misses the fraternal "give and take", through
which he tossed out new ideas and got candid feedback.
Dialogue is an integral part of Kolb's Experiential
Learning Model (Figure 2); absence of dialogue inhibits
learning. Recognition of his need for a dialogue partner
may be implicit in Libert's decision to hire a consultant
at this time.
O'Connor and Minder want consultants to help them
formulate strategies for dealing with organizational
disequilibrium caused by rising levels of employee
dissatisfaction. O'Connor's explicit desire for a
facilitator is couched in terms of process. He knows that
dealing with his "problem" (unrest among the staff) is
important to maintaining Copley's success in its
relationship-based business. The decision that Copley
needs an independent, third-party consultant does not come
from regression analysis. Rather, it comes from
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O'Connor's experience (during previous engagements),
openness (to the 1987 MIT case study), and internal values
("We stress people".) O'Connor seems to recognize that
future success depends on how well Copley manages both the
internal, human resource systems, and the deal-making in
the external environment. When O'Conner tells Thornberry
that Copley needs a facilitator to lead the retreat
discussions through resolution of action plans, he's
asking for process consultation. O'Connor's ability to be
both retrospective and prospective, is consistent with
Mintzberg's notion that strategy is crafted from past
behavior and future goals.
Like O'Connor, Minder is searching for the means to
manage organizational change. His focus is initially on
human resource management (job descriptions). More
explicitly than O'Connor, Minder defines his strategic
"problem" in terms of organizational development and
marketplace activities. An example is Minder's
description of both the project requirements (more
sensitivity needed in dealing with communities on zoning
issues) and the partners' needs (ownership of ideas).
In summary, the recognition of need for consulting
services differs among the three sites in terms of
orientation and expectation. Milestone's needs are
defined in terms of its competitive external environment,
and the consultant is expected to analyze data and produce
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decision options. Copley's and Branham's needs are for
internal change; they expect consultants to provide the
means for the firms' self-analysis and
decision-making.
ENGAGEMENT DECISION
The engagement decision can be subdivided into three
areas: selection criteria, decision-making process, and
defined outcomes/activities. It is interesting to examine
how attention to process, even at this preliminary stage
of the engagement, affects outcome and relates to the
definition of the task.
Libert's single selection criterion, i.e., the
consultant must be either BCG or McKinsey, is much
narrower than Nees and Greiner (1985) recommend.
Nevertheless, Libert seems to match his stated need with
the consultant's skills for this engagement. BCG is a
"strategic navigator" type consultant (see Figure 3) whose
approach is to model key variables to help the client find
a more profitable market niche. If Libert decides to
engage a consultant for other kinds of strategic-planning
issues, e.g., organizational development, then his
selection criterion will be less effective. The focus in
organizational development is on the processes of people
working together. "Strategic navigators" are not
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well-suited to that kind of issue. Libert has also
achieved a match with BCG in terms of working style.
Their relationship in past engagments has been friendly
and productive. Clearly, that positive experience
influences Libert's decision.
The Copley site illustrates a more deliberate effort
to match needs and skills. O'Connor's interest in getting
a more effective consultant than he had for the second
retreat, and in using the MIT case data, fits Kolb's
Experiential Learning Model. He had two previous
experiences with consultants, reflected on them, formed
new concepts (i.e., selection criteria for the next
consultant), and then tested them (interview and choose a
new consultant).
Minder's selection criteria also stress matching
Branham's needs with the consultant's skills. He is
cognizant that "cookie-cutter" approaches frequently
offered by large, nationwide, management consultants, are
not appropriate for Branham's employee-interrelationship
problems. Minder bases the selection, also, on his past
experience, i.e., his knowledge and enthusiasm for
Argyris' work. The consultants chosen by Branham and
Copley are diagnositicians. They have similar
characteristics to Nees & Greiner's "management
physician", except, their backgrounds are in behavioral
science, rather than general management. They are
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well-suited to the assigned tasks.
The decision-making processes to retain a consultant
run the gamut from strictly sole-source (Milestone) to
collective (Branham). Libert's mode seems inconsistent
with Nees and Greiner's recommendation for collective
decision-making among senior staff. However, the
long-term relationship between BCG and Milestone, and the
nature of the task (esssentially data collection and
analysis), may preclude the need for a group decision in
this case. At Copley, where the consultant's activities
focus on the internal operations of the firm, it makes
sense for O'Connor to include his senior staff in the
decision-making process by soliciting their
recommendations for an appropriate facilitator.
Branham uses the most collective decision-making
process. Having agreed on the choice of consultant,
managers at Branham have a more vested interest in the
success of the engagement than those at Milestone, or at
Copley, where the choice is O'Connor's. The extent to
which managers participate in the consultant selection
decision is determined by the task and/or focus, and
relates to their subsequent level of cooperation.
In terms of defining outcomes and/or activities at
the outset of the engagement, neither Libert nor Leland
spells out his expectations. They rely on what Libert
describes as their "mutual understanding of the consulting
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profession, its mission, likely results and attendant
costs." Leland's retrospective comments, that he wishes he
had spent more time, at the outset, to learn "how far he
(Libert) was willing to go with the company," suggest that
early, more explicit dialogue to define outcomes is
mutually beneficial.
By contrast, O'Connor and Thornberry speak with more
candor and specificity about their expectations (e.g.,
O'Conner wants a facilitator and action plans) and
requirements (e.g., Thornberry insists on access to the
organization and anonymity for employees he will
interview). The letter of agreement clarifies and
confirms the engagement activities, thereby minimizing the
potential for wasted resources and unrealized
expectations.
Argyris' preliminary discussions with Minder and
Branham's senior staff result in a redefinition of the
"problem." Though initially approached by Minder to help
define roles and lines of authority in the organization,
Argyris suggests to the Branham group that a better
approach would be for them to examine their individual
behavior patterns. He proposes (and carefully explains
the process) to facilitate the examination, and help them
find ways of altering behavior they want to change. Their
consensus decision to accept Argyris' proposal is the
beginning of his process consultation at Branham. It sets
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the stage for a collective effort by the fully-engaged
group of owners and senior staff. The Branham site
supports Schein's (1988) finding that an important part of
any consultation process is helping the client figure out
what the problem is.
ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
The engagements illustrate varying degrees of
process consultation. For example, the process
consultation aspects of Leland's work at Milestone are
limited to his data delivery sessions with Libert (and
occasionally with other managers). Leland's comment that
"it wouldn't be productive for us (BCG) to make decisions
and then for the client to ignore them" sounds more
focused on liability than on learning. His definition of
process seems more related to client accountability than
to teaching the client new skills. When Libert opines
that the engagement with Leland is more process than
product-oriented, he is referring to the substitution of
informally-presented, piecemeal, data summaries and
discussions, for voluminous reports. By limiting the
number of meetings, and the involvement of other managers,
Libert manages the client/consultant relationship to
ensure that Leland focuses more on content (i.e., data)
than on process (i.e., behavior). To the extent that
Leland enlists Libert in formulating successive steps
during the engagement, the methodology is more
process-oriented than BCG's 1970's production mode (e.g.,
get an assignment, gather and analyze data, and write a
report). The Milestone case exemplifies the industry-wide
evolution in the modus operandi of the large management
consulting firms.
The loneliness Libert feels since his brother's
departure is common among CEOs; they often- lack an
unbiased, reliable "sounding board" among their senior
staff; hence, the need for an outside consultant who, in
addition to bringing new skills, can lend an understanding
ear. In this engagement, Libert's and Leland's
relationship mirrors step #3 ("Conduct diagnosis that may
redefine the problem") on Turner's heirarchy of
objectives. (See Figure 4A.)
Figure 4A SITES' ACHIEVEMENTS ON HEIRARCHY OF CONSULTING FURPOSES
8.Improve Organizational Effectiveness
7. Facilitate Client Learning BRAHAM
6. Build Consensus and Commitment COPLEY
5. Assist Implementation
4. Provide Recommendations
3. Conduct Diagnosis That May Redefine Problem #ILESTOHE
2. Provide Solution to a Given Problem
i, Provide Requested Information
Adapted from Turner (1992, p. 122)
At Copley, both the client and consultant are
focusing on process. O'Connor's recognition of the human
resources needs, and his interest in changing how the
organization operates, are classic process issues. By
giving Thornberry full access to the organization and
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agreeing to guaranteed anonymity for those interviewed,
O'Connor ensures that the entire organization is
represented in the process. Thornberry's data is the
catalyst for discussions about problems at Copley, but his
role is not to provide optional solutions. Rather, his
interest is in having managers learn how to recognize,
discuss and commit to solving problems. The managers'
acquisition of those diagnostic and communicative skills
bodes well for the future growth at Copley, which places
high value on human relationships. Thornberry's approach
is characteristic of process consultation. By going
beyond discussion of problems to formulation of action
plans, Thornberry and Copley reached step #6 ("Build
consensus and commitment") on Turner's heirarchy. (Figure
4A.)
Like Copley, Branham is concerned with process. "We
wanted him to show us a path," says Minder about Argyris.
The Branham site illustrates more direct one-on-one
intervention than is obvious at Copley (where Thornberry's
scope of work is more organizational). Whereas Copley
managers formulate plans to change how the organization
functions, Branham managers work to alter their individual
behavior patterns. They are honing their individual and
group process skills (e.g., recognition of defensive
routines). The implications for personal, as well as
organizational, growth are considerable. (The departure
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of the two project managers shows that growth is not
without its difficulties.)
To the extent that managers expand their capacities
to be more facile at "reading" their colleagues, superiors
and subordinates, the entire organization will operate
with fewer misunderstandings and hidden agendas. The
managers at Branham acquired skills from the consultant
which they subsequently used to redesign the project
management function. During this engagement, Branham and
Argyris reached step #7, "Facilitate Client Learning," on
Turner's heirarchy. (Figure 4A.)
Schein (1988, p 5.) defines process consultation (PC):
PC is a set of activities on the part of the
consultant that help the client to perceive,
understand, and act upon the process events
that occur in the client's environment in
order to improve the situation as defined by
the client.
At Copley and Branham, consultants enlist managers to
effect change. Their methodologies make those sites
relatively consistent with Schein's definition.
Thornberry's activities to gather data, assist with the
retreat agenda, and facilitate the retreat, are consonant
with process consultation. His interviews with employees
are a critical step in the process. By guaranteeing
anonymity to employees from all levels and departments in
the firm, he licenses them to be frank and honest. The
interviews yield valuable data which is then used to help
Page 79
O'Connor rewrite the retreat agenda. Without the data, it
is doubtful that the retreat participants would have dealt
with the issues most pertinent to the "problem" identified
by O'Conner at the outset. A comparison of the retreat
memorandi of April 3, 1987 (Appendix A) and June 8, 1987
(Appendix D) shows the effect of Thornberry's
data-gathering. The latter memo spells out goals, ground
rules, and suggests nine areas of concern for discussion
and actions. O'Connor's overt support for Thornberry's
activities at Copley is important to the success of the
engagement; it sets the stage for the process consultant's
intervention. For Thornberry (as for other process
consultants) the data gathering does not not occur prior
to intervention; it is intervention.
At Branham, a longer-term application of Argyris'
methods would better typify his experiences with process
consultation. Argyris defines the Branham engagement as
bypass intervention because it circumvents an examination
of the entire firm's operations, and focuses on one issue:
managers' roles and responsibilities. Taken as a
microcosm, however, it exemplifies Schein's definition.
By observing a typical work event (the managers'
meetings), Argyris can most effectively intervene in the
human processes which (according to Schein's model) are
fundamentally involved in creating and solving
organizational problems. Argyris is able to help the
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managers identify where individuals' goals converge or
diverge with goals common to the organization. An example
is the "discovery" that the two project managers who are
most resistant to being held accountable for their
decisions, are, in fact, personally ill-suited for the
managerial independence they originally sought at Branham.
Argyris teaches how to recognize defensive routines; this
empowers the managers to more accurately diagnose and
solve of their own problems.
Schein's Purchase of Expertise Model most closely
defines the Milestone engagement where the consultant
serves less to facilitate and more to inform. This model
is the most prevalent in the industry. The client defines
a need and realizes that the organization doesn't have the
resources to fulfill the need, so a consultant is hired to
provide the information or service. The consultant shares
knowledge, as Leland did at Milestone, but he generally
does not transfer skills to the client. Even at
Milestone, however, with its external/product focus, there
is evidence that process consultation occurs and is
important to the engagement's success. Leland's
one-on-one sessions with Libert, providing data and
getting feedback, represent a new variation on the 1970's
theme of big-business, management consultants (like BCG).
Clients today are demanding more involvement; consultants
are responding with more attention to process.
Figure 7 summarizes the scope of process consultation
at the three sites. It illustrates the relationship
between the client's problem-solving orientation (internal
vs. external) and the level of process consultation. The
more external-focused, the more the client will look to
the consultant for information or a particular service.
The figure also shows that the highest degree of process
consultation occurs when the client's focus is on changing
individual behavior.
Figure 7 SCOPE OF PROCESS CONSULTATION
MILESTONE. COPLEY & BRANHAM SITES
INTERNAL POCUS
Individual Change Branha
INTERNAL FOCUS *
Organizational Change Copley
EXTERNAL FOCUS *
Milestone
PROCESS CONSULTATION
EVALUATION OF ENGAGEMENT
Figure 8 presents the consultants' and clients'
scores for the success of the relationship. In all cases,
both parties reported higher-than-average levels of
satisfaction with the engagement. It is interesting to
note that at two sites, Milestone and Branham, the scores
of the clients and consultants are within half a point of
each other; at Copley, there is more disparity.
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Figure 8 EVALUATION OF ENGAGEMENTS
MILESTONE
Libert *
Leland *
COPLEY
O'Connor *
Thornberry
BRANHAM
Minder
Argyris *
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
SUCCESS------------------------------
The closeness of Libert's and Leland's scores (7 to
8) suggests a similarity in measurement criteria not
supported in the data. Leland defines BCG's success
criterion as providing "value-added" services which result
in higher profitability for the client. In addition, he
cites Libert's decision to shrink the firm as
demonstrative of the engagement's success. (There are no
data to indicate the effectiveness of the decision.)
Leland's reflections (e.g., that he'd prefer more time in
general discussions with Libert and other managers) may
indicate a predisposition to more process consultation
during future engagements at Milestone. It is clear that
Leland's key criterion for measuring the highest degree of
success is the level of challenge involved in the
engagement.It is unclear whether "challenge" means more
process or more technical complexity. Libert likes what
he got from Leland and says he wants more analytical help
from BCG so he can continue to change the direction of the
company. The fact that he seldom mentions other people in
the company, in terms of their importance to deciding or
effecting the mission of Milestone, sets him apart (in
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this engagement) from O'Connor and Minder.
Another similarity between Milestone and Branham is
Minder's interest in engaging the consultant more often.
His measure of "value added" is different from Libert's,
however. For him, the engagement's success is manifested
in changed behavior at Branham, not in the delivery of
relevant data. He notes that Argyris "left us with no
easy answers, just the means to solve our own problems".
His score of 8.5 indicates a high level of satisfaction.
Both Argyris and Minder talk about the "chemistry" of the
engagement (the human dynamics element) as important to
its success. Argyris' high score (9) confirms his feeling
that the engagement was successful, notwithstanding its
relative brevity. His criteria are rooted in his research
agenda (e.g., this site added to his "capital stock of
knowledge") and his process ground rules (e.g.,full
participation).
At the Copley site, there is less agreement between
client and consultant about the engagement's success.
O'Connor's measure, based on developing action plans for
organizational change, is consistent with his expectations
at the outset. His belief that the managers' heightened
awareness, together with his new rule for more dialogue,
corrects the organization's flaws, is out of "sync" with
Thornberry's. The latter's contention, that follow-up
management training programs are necessary, reflects a
Page 84
difference in attitude about whether or not formulating
action plans at a retreat goes far enough to ensure that
day-to-day behavior will subsequently change. The absence
of consultant involvement during implementation of action
plans at Copley renders the fit less than perfect with the
Schein definition . Without the consultant's observing and
giving feedback on the implementation, there is no way to
gauge if the client has gone beyond perceiving and
understanding the "problem" to acting upon process events
in the organization in order to improve the situation (the
"problem" as defined by the client.) The 2.5-point
disparity in scores represents the disagreement between
O'Conner and Thornberry on the depth and breadth of the
retreat's likely impacts on the organization over the long
term.
O'Connor, explaining his success score of 9.5 to 10,
remarks on all that has changed at Copley since the
retreat. He feels all participants learned a lot. His
preliminary decision to collect inhouse data for the next
retreat, without the using a process consultant, suggests
that he may not have learned the importance of having an
outside consultant (like Thornberry) perform that task.
Although he values Thornberry's approach, he may not fully
understand that special skills are necessary. Does he see
that Thornberry's independent, objective data-gathering is
an integral part of the process? Schein (1988) tells us
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the process consultation is deeply anchored in social
psychology, sociology and anthropology. Understanding how
to intervene in human processes goes beyond having a "good
attitude", "open dialogue" and a "willingness to change".
A CEO should not expect that his employees (no matter how
loyal) will be as candid and honest with an inhouse data
collector, as with an outside consultant who guarantees
them anonymity. Although the client can learn basic
communicative and intuitive skills from the process
consultant, that falls far short of becoming an expert in
the field. If O'Connor teaches Thornberry how to figure
financial ratios, has he transferred to Thornberry his
body of theoretical knowledge and experience? No. If
Thornberry explains his data-gathering techniques to
O'Connor, has he transmitted all the skills necessary for
effective data-gathering? No.
In summary, the three consultants share a common
interest in providing promised "value added" to their
clients. They measure success also in terms of their
personal, professional growth as management consultants
( e.g., Leland's preference for "challenge"; Thornberry's
interest in more involvement in implementation; Argyris'
additions to his "capital stock" of knowledge). Leland
also measures success in terms of BCG's corporate
criteria.
The process-oriented clients, O'Connor and Minder,
measure success in terms of how organizational behavior
changes; Libert, more content-oriented, measures success
in terms of what he changes as a result of data received
from the consultant.
On the basis of clients' expectations, the
engagements at the three sites are successful. Each
client achieves a higher-than-average level of
satisfaction. However, since the research does not
include interviews with anyone other than the CEO, it is
impossible to determine the extent to which other managers
agree with the success scores shown on Figure 8.
In terms of process consultation (the Schein
definition), the results are more variable. The minimal
level of process consultation at Milestone does not mean
Leland's work is faulty. Clearly, Libert receives from
the consultant both the process and product he wants.
Libert is confident his subsequent decisions, based on
Leland's data, will enable Milestone to emerge from its
transitional stage leaner and able to more effectively
operate in the marketplace. The research suggests,
however, that Libert needs to also examine the impact of
those decisions. Specifically, Libert needs to know if
the people at Milestone are willing, able and committed to
the changes he makes. The data do not indicate the
effects of Libert's decision on the people in the
organization.
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Process consultation at Copley, organizationally
focused, facilitates the raising of critical issues for
management review and formulation of action plans at the
retreat. A critical part of the process is Thornberry's
data-gathering, which allows a cross-section of employees
to vent their frustrations. The subsequent decision of
managers (at the retreat) to not acknowledge the
"ownership" of those frustrations (despite the
declarations about "openness" with O'Connor), is evidence
that Thornberry's ombudsman function is a key component in
discovering the sources of dissatisfaction.
At Branham, process consultation results in changed
behavior among managers. Argyris' intervention at the
individual level enables managers to concentrate on
self-analysis, personally and collectively, and to then
apply their new skills organizationally. The events at
the Branham site are consistent with Schein's (1988)
opinion that understanding human processes and the ability
to improve those processes is fundamental to any
organizational improvement.
**** * ** ***
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CHAPTER FOUR
FINAL COMMENTS
Development is often compared with making a movie.
The analogy works because success in each industry relies
on both art and science, people and technology.
Ultimately, what makes or breaks either the development or
the movie are the people, without whom the projects are
lackluster and dormant. Therefore, crafting strategies
for future growth in either industry requires
concentration on what makes people work well together.
How can developers work with management consultants to
effect strategies? What guidelines can be gleaned from
this research? What lessons can be learned?
One important lesson is that real estate development
companies are finding value when they engage management
consultants to help with growth-related, organizational
development issues, in addition to their use of technical
experts to provide data and quantitative analyses. The
executives at Copley and Branham recognize that the growth
of their companies depends in large part on how well the
people in their organizations work together. They
understand, too, that managing the interrelationships is
hard work, and requires different skills than designing a
building or analyzing financial statements. Part of this
lesson is that a skilled consultant is needed to
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facilitate the process of learning new leadership skills.
Developers, working with process consultants, can expand
their skills beyond savvy deal-making, to include managing
their complex operations and leading their changing
organizations.
Guideline #1: Wise investments in management consultants
can yield competitive advantage.
The second lesson is that real estate developers
should be as discriminating in their selection of a
consultant as they are in their choice of a joint
venturer. Different situations require different
partners. Matching the firm's needs with the consultant's
skills can save time, frustration and money.
Guideline #2: Be an informed consumer.
The third lesson is that strategic planning is an
ongoing, dynamic, artistic process. It is manifested not
so much in five-year plans, as in a continuing effort (led
by the CEO) to manage all the firm's resources,
particularly its people, toward organizational and
personal growth. As Argyris wrote, "Strategy is the
vehicle for thinking about change. It is at the heart of
managing any organization."(1985, p.4)
Guideline #3: Strategic planning looks both backward and
forward.
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The fourth lesson is that the highest return on
investment in management consulting services comes when
the consultant transmits to the client some of his/her
skills. Solution consultants (e.g., Nees & Greiner's
"strategic navigators," "mental adventurers," and "system
architects") focus on research, plans, and designs. They
deliver products - knowledge, schemes for higher
profitability and greater efficiency- to their clients.
Generally, they do not transfer their skills. Process
consultants, by contrast, believe their essential function
is teaching human process skills to empower the client to
effectively lead the organization. The highest-value
consultant facilitates the client's learning, and leaves
the client with added skills to diagnose and solve
problems in the future.
Guideline #4: Make sure each consulting engagement is a
learning experience.
This research demonstrates that the client has the
responsibility for managing the relationship with the
consultant to maximize the value to the firm. The research
sites include incidents which illustrate less-than-optimum
outcomes for the client. For example, when O'Connor
decides against follow-up management training for his
senior staff, he may be foregoing the opportunity to
ensure that managers have the skills to implement the
action plans devised at the retreat. When he decides
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against using a process consultant for data-gathering for
the Fall 1988 retreat, it's an indication that he may be
missing the point of Thornberry's role. The data
employees give to Thornberry is information that may not
otherwise get to the top of the organization - to O'Connor
and his senior staff. Despite his best efforts to create
a "small company" atmosphere, and notwithstanding the
extremely high regard his employees have for him, O'Connor
(like most CEOs) still needs a Thornberry-type ombudsman
to perform a mental health check on the firm from time to
time.
Guideline #5: Don't assume you can become your own process
consultant by osmosis.
At Branham, Minder describes how the managers used
the skills taught by Argyris to reach consensus on a new
project management system over the course of six months.
Too much process without action can be detrimental. With
live projects to manage, Branham needs to "stick to the
knitting." At what point does too much process become a.
liability to the firm? Process consultants can be engaged
for follow-up service, to intermittently evaluate
processes, and to keep the firm on track during
implementation of change.
Guideline #6: Practice preventive medicine: get regular
check-ups.
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The final lesson is that organizational growth and
personal growth can be (and usually are) mutually
supportive and catalytic with the help of the "right"
consultant. Part of this lesson is that good "chemistry"
between the client and consultant (as evidenced at the
three research sites) is prerequisite to an instructive
engagement, particularly with a process consultant hired
for an organizational development issue. To the extent
that Argyris, Leland and Thornberry help their clients
communicate more effectively, think more clearly, and
behave more rationally, they facilitate both
organizational and individual change. For their parts,
the clients (in addition to widening the consultants'
experience base), increase the consultants' understanding
of the real estate development industry. With the added
experience of each engagement, the consultant becomes a
more valuable resource for the client. A successful
engagement, a reciprocol endeavor, is a win/win situation
for both parties.
Guideline #7: Make sure learning is a two-way street.
Some conclusions are drawn from the research. The
first is that management consultants are not all the same.
Their varying approaches, different "success" criteria,
and wide-ranging areas of expertise, make them a
heterogeneous group.
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Second, the research indicates that process consultants
are generally operating outside the mainstream of the
management consulting industry, which is dominated by
"solution consultants" and the "Big Eight" accounting
firms.
Third, the findings strongly suggest that real estate
developers seeking advice on organizational development
issues should hire process consultants. These consultants
are experts on human behavior and interrelationships, the
operational lifeline of the organization. It is essential
that managers, particularly the CEO, understand the human
processes at work in their companies, in order to
effectively lead their organizations. With process
consultants as their partners in learning, developers can
make the strategic changes necessary for healthy growth.
Finally, it is concluded that the real estate
development company which attends to the human processes
in its organization, i.e., is interested in learning at
all levels, is more likely to succeed than one which
limits its focus to analyzing markets, making deals and
crunching numbers.
What Kolb wrote fifteen years ago is particularly
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applicable to real estate development firms in 1988. On
management and the learning process, Kolb said:
Today's highly successful manager or administrator
is distinguished not so much by any single set of
knowledge or skills but by the ability to adapt to
and master the changing demands of job and career,
i.e., by the ability to learn. The same is true for
successful organizations. Continuing success in a
changing world requires an ability to explore new
opportunities and learn from past successes and
failures.
(Kolb, 1973, p.27)
WORKS CITED IN CHAPTER FOUR
Argyris, Chris. Strategy, Change and Defensive
Routines, Pitman: Marshfield, Ma., 1985, p.l.
Kolb, D.A. "On Management and the Learning Process",
Sloan School Working Paper 652-73, MIT: Cambridge,
Ma., 1973.
Nees, Danielle and Greiner, Larry E. "Seeing Behind
the Look-Alike Management Consultants,"
Organizational Dynamics, Winter 1985, pp. 68-79.
Page 96
APPENDIX A: Preliminary Retreat Agenda Memorandum
COPLEY REAL ESTATE ADVISORS MEMORANDUM
TO: Distribution
FROM: David R. Jarvis"
Linda A. Stolle't
DATE: April 3, 1987
RE: Corporate Planning Meeting
A corporate planning meeting has been scheduled for
Wednesday, June 10th through Friday, June 12th (with the
option to stay through the weekend), at the White Elephant
on Nantucket.
Please plan to arrive on Nantucket Wednesday afternoon. A
group dinner will be held Wednesday (as well as Thursday)
night. Discussion sessions will be held Thursday morning,
Thursday afternoon, Friday morning and possibly Friday
afternoon. Spouses are invited to arrive Friday afternoon
and a group dinner will be held Friday night. Saturday and
Sunday will be free days, with no formal activities
scheduled.
Rooms have already been reserved in your name. Flight
arrangements for yourself and your spouse can be made by
contacting Andrea at Fugazy Travel (367-0507) and will be
billed to a master account. Since this is peak season and
flights are limited, please make your reservations as soon
as possible.
A separate memorandum will follow containing a more detailed
schedule. Please contact either of us should you have any
questions.
Distribution: Stephen'Anthony, Daniel Coughlin, Scott
Edwards, James Flynn, Jack Gardner, Michael Harrity, Pam
Herbst, Kevin Mahony, Joseph O'Connor, Jack Phillips, Lou
Russo, Steve St. Thomas, Bill Salisbury, Peter Twining,
Charlie Valentino
DRJ25.5
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APPENDIX A: Preliminary Retreat Agenda Memorandum
COPLEY REAL ESTATE ADVISORS MEMORANDUM
TO: Distribution
FROM: David R. Jarvis
Linda A. StolleU
DATE: April 3, 1987
RE: Corporate Planning Session
Three general areas of discussion have been suggested
for our corporate planning sessions in Nantucket. Attached
is a preliminary outline of those initial issues. We would
appreciate receiving by 5:00 PM Thursday, April 9;
1. suggestions as to other major
topics of discussion;
2. more specific refinements and
additions to the general outline,
and;
3. suggestions as to worthwhile books
or articles relevant to these issues.
Once all comments have been incorporated, we will meet
with everyone in the company in focus groups of about eight
to add further input. That revised discussion paper,
together with various suggested readings, will then again be
distributed.
If you have any questions or comments, please contact
either of us. Thanks.
Distribution: Stephen Anthony, Daniel Coughlin, Scott
Edwards, James Flynn, Jack Gardner, Michael Harrity, Pam
Herbst, Kevin Mahony, Joseph O'Connor, Jack Phillips, Lou
Russo, Steve St. Thomas, Bill Salisbury, Peter Twining,
Charlie Valentino
DRJ26.5
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Preliminary Discussion Topics
1. Growth of the Company
- Should we continue to grow
- Do we have a choice
- Is growth good or bad
- For personal opportunity
- For personal enrichment
- For the corporate culture
- What are the directions of growth
- Should we diversify
- What are the other implications of growth
- In what areas will growth occur
- How do we best plan growth
Where will we be in 1988, 1989 and 1990
2. Motivation/Job Enrichment for All
- How do we motivate all employees
- How do we enrich the job experiences of all employees
- Why are there only two titles
- How do people advance at Copley
- How does one become a phantom phantom stockholder
- How does one become a principal
3. Client Service
- What is our corporate objective with respect to
client service
- How important is client service
- Are we spending enough time on client service
- How good is our current client service
- How can we improve our client service
- Individual clients
- Institutional clients
DRJ27.5
APPENDIX B: A Diagrammatic Model for Action Research
Perception of
Problem(s) by
Key Individual
Consultation with
Behavioral Scientist
Expert
Data Gathering and
Preliminary
Diagnosis by
Consultant
Feedback to Key
Client or Group
Joint Diagnosis
of Problem
Joint Action Planning
(Setting objectives
and goals)
Action
Data Gathering
After Action
Feedback to Client
Group by Consultant
Rediagnosis and
Action Programs
with Client and
Consultant
New Action
New Data Gathering
as a Result of
Action
Rediagnosis of
Situation
,,
Etc.
Etc.
Fig. 2 A Diagrammatic Model for Action Research(Adapted from W. French, "Organization Development: Objectives, Assumptions and Strategies," Califomia
Management Review, Xi, 2, Winter 1969, p. 26.)
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APPENDIX C: Thornberry Data, Representative Comments
SELECTED. REPRESENTATIVE COMMENTS FROM
NEIL'S ONE ON ONE INTERVIEWS
1. If you had to characterize Copley as an animal, vegetable,
mineral or metaphor. how would you describe it?
o Tiger - more like a lion, aggressive but cares for
it pride.
o Double Sessions Football - hot work, hard work, it
never ends. Its fun but draining.
o Three Ring Circus - only quality performers need
apply.
o Care bear - with a frown.
o Gorilla - we throw things out of our cage and say
get this done and get that done.
o A place where the princes are cashing out and the
paupers are running as fast as they can.
o A nice book cover - underneath very complex and
dynamic but not without problems, but you want
to keep reading.
o Like a new building under construction -
fast-slow-fast.
o Rush hour on the Expressway - a new deal everyday
o Almost drowning - but not quite.
o Heaven next to a crocodile.
o A controlled explosion - hungry machine requires
constant feeding, very efficient with resources.
o Gem - we do what we do extremely well, but its
important not to get tarnished.
o A fun party - but a little less fun than it used to
be.
o Extra special pizza - with a lot of diverse things on
top. Some fit and some don't.
o Senior week - a million things going on, a lot of
emotional ups and downs.
APPENDIX C: Thornberry Data, Representative Comments
Page 102
o Rose - pretty from a distance, but as you get closer
it has thorns.
o Committed to excellence - a lot of pride.
o Ant Farm - amazed at how well organized we are
without that much communication, frenetic energy.
o Celtics - moving, running, ambitious, hard working,
but we are a lot younger.
o Like wading upstream in a swamp at midnight, not sure
where you're going or what's going to hit you.
2. If you could make one change at Copley. what would it be?
o Senior management should become more involved in
corporate decision making. Now its just a foursome.
o Slow growth and do some consolidating.
o Split Joe's duties - He's a super production guy,
break off his leadership and culture piece.
o Position ourselves better for long term stability.
o Joe to be more approachable without making people
feel uncomfortable.
o Nothing, its a wonderful place.
o More team work, we're getting more specialized and
departmentalized.
o Greater definition of job duties and
responsibilities.
o Work on communications. Better dissemination of
information.
o Hire a chief operating officer.
o Push more authority and decision making downward.
o Better performance evaluation and goal setting.
APPENDIX D: Final Retreat Agenda Memorandum
COPLEY REAL ESTATE ADVISORS MEMORANDUM
TO: Distribution
FROM: Joseph W. O'Connor
DATE: June 8, 1987
RE: Nantucket Meeting Topics for Discussion
Attached is a list of tentative goals, a list of topics and
comments and a preliminary meeting schedule which were
prepared with Neil Thornberry, our facilitator, based on the
data collected through his interviews and the focus groups.
Our goals should be:
To get to know one another better
To examine the organizational challenges and issues
which face Copley
To make recommendations on how best to approach these
challenges and issues and
To have some fun
Our approach should be:
Participative, constructive, problem solving and
action-oriented.
In order to facilitate our discussions, we should all observe
certain ground rules:
All people are equals
All people will work as a team to solve problems
Our approach will be pro-active and constructive
All discussion will be on corporate concerns and not
personal interaction issues.
There will be no personal criticism
We will use time effectively
In preparation, please review and consider the attached list
of topics, comments and questions, which are in no
particular order. These represent topics or comments raised
by a majority of the individuals at Copley. More specific
data will follow in Nantucket.
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STRENGTHS
o How do we maintain the excellence and success we've
achieved thus far?
o How do we keep attracting, motivating and retaining
the brightest and best?
o Should we keep doing the things we do best and take
only business that fits our strategy?
o We know our strategy and execute it extremely well.
o We have a shared attitude of doing whatever it takes
to get the job done.
o Copley is an above average place to work.
o People are proud to be associated with Copley.
CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS
Culture
o The caring philosophy does not filter down to
lower levels of the organization.
o The expressed values of the organization do not
coincide with actions.
o How do we keep our family orientation in the
face of growth?
o Are we a sexist organization?
Career Development Issues
o There are no career paths at Copley.
o Senior positions are filled from the outside.
o Delegation by principals doesn't happen -
responsibility and authority are pushed down
only by abdication - the principals want to make
all the decisions.
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Communication
o Joe receives only selective information.
o How do we keep good information flowing between
departments without too much structure?
o Information flow from the principals down is
inconsistent.
Job Satisfaction/Morale
o Are we hiring over-qualified people for some
jobs?
o How do we keep lower levels motivated and
enthused?
o The title "associate" is not enough.
Compensation
o Compensation is not reflective of the
organization's success or the amount of work an
individual does.
o Compensation is not perceived to be fairly or
equitably distributed.
o How do you get into stock plans?
o Secretaries should not be excluded from the
bonus pool.
o Top management thinks compensations is extremely
good, while others don't.
Organizational Structure
o How do we provide career opportunities without
becoming too layered or bureaucratic?
o There are no benchmarks that provide
differentiation from others. -
o People's job duties and responsibilities should
be effectively defined.
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Management
o There isn't any real management going on at
Copley.
o Deal-makers are valued, effective managers are
not.
Client Service
o Should we care more about client services?
o How do we include more people at different
levels in client relationships?
o Client service is essential to our success and
reputation, but no one wants to do the reporting
it requires.
o People don't think enough about client service,
we take it for granted.
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TENTATIVE MEETING SCHEDULE
Thursday, June 11
8:00 a.m.
8:15 a.m.
Introduction
Overview of 2 Days
Joe O'Connor
Neil Thornberry
- Goals/Purposes
- Ground Rules
- Desired Outcome
- Definition of Neil
Thornberry's role
- Ownership of Work
Product
8:30 a.m.
9:00 a.m.
11:00 a.m.
and thereafter
Meeting Kick-Off Neil Thornberry
Issue Presentation Neil Thornberry
Problem Definition and
Rank Order Issues All Participants
Selection of Discussion
Topics
Discussion by All Participants
Topic Area
- Topic
- Sub-issues
- Alternative Solutions
- Conclusions
- Action Plan
Friday, June 12
8:00 a.m.
and thereafter
Discussion by All Participants
Topic Area
- Topic
- Sub-issues
- Alternative Solutions
- Conclusions
- Action Plan
Wrap Up of Meeting Joe O'Connor
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COPLEY PLANNING MEETING
ACTION PLAN
TITLES
Task Force:
Goal:
Direction:
Date:
Peter Bailey
Jack Gardner (Chairperson)
Gail Litchfield
Lou Russo
Linda Stoller
Recommendation to Executive Committee
as to the nature and type of titles
to be utilized at Copley
To utilize a more extensive title
system, limited as to the number of
levels, on a company wide basis
Report to Executive Committee by
July 15
Response from Executive Committee by
August 15
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COPLEY PLANNING MEETING
ACTION PLAN
CAREER TRACK/PATH
Task Force:
Goal:
Direction:
Date:
Executive Committee
To provide all individuals at Copley
with an understanding of the
potential career tracks and a method
of obtaining advancement
Executive Committee to define and set
criteria for advancing to phantom,
phantom phantom and all job levels at
Copley
Report Complete by August 15
Implementation to begin thereafter and
will be on-going
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COPLEY PLANNING MEETING
ACTION PLAN
JOB ENRICHMENT
Task Force:
Goal:
Direction:
Date:
Scott Edwards
Pam Herbst
Kevin Mahony
Steve St. Thomas
Peter Twining
4 Associates to be Nominated
To review job content with a view to
enriching the interest level and quality
of each job at Copley
Review the elements of job enrichment
and their application to the Copley
environment
Report to Executive Committee by
August 31
Response from Executive Committee by
September 30
Implementation will be on-going
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